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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The scope of the conspiracy boggles the mind.”1  But for the 
sinister background music, the worldwide vitamin manufacturers’ 
recent global price fixing conspiracy resembles a James Bond film, 
as “[f]or a full decade, top executives at some of the world’s largest 
drug companies met secretly in hotel suites and at conferences”2 
throughout Europe and the United States to “carve up the vitamin 
market”3 and to fix vitamin prices used in products bought and 
consumed by all Americans everyday.4  “When Federal investigators 
were closing in, they moved to the homes of high-level European 
executives.”5  Meeting clandestinely in places like Paris, France; 
Basel, Switzerland; and Lugwigshafen, Germany, these 
manufacturers illegally fixed, raised, maintained and stabilized 
vitamin prices and allocated global vitamin markets with impunity.  
The manufacturers’ conspiracy was “the most pervasive and 
harmful criminal antitrust conspiracy ever uncovered,”6 and it 
impacted consumers every time they paid for food containing these 
manufacturers’ vitamins—from “cereal to orange juice to vitamin 
pills . . . .”7  The vitamin manufacturers targeted our nation’s 
consumers as their ultimate victims, since without an end-use 
consumer market no demand for their vitamins would have existed, 
and their price fixing conspiracy would have been meaningless. 
 
  1. David Barboza, Tearing Down the Façade of “Vitamins Inc.,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
10, 1999, at C1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. Id.  See also United States v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., No. 99-CR-184-R 
(N.D. Tex. May 20, 1999) (Department of Justice Guilty Plea at ¶ 4(b)), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/hoffman.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004); 
United States v. BASF Aktiengesellschaft, No. 3-99-CR-200-R (N.D. Tex. May 20, 
1999) (BASF AG’s Guilty Plea at ¶ 4(b)), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
cases/f2400/basf.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 5. Barboza, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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But the vitamin manufacturers were eventually caught.  For 
their crimes, two of the three conspiracy leaders, F. Hoffman-La 
Roche Ltd. and BASF AG, pleaded guilty and paid fines to the U.S. 
Department of Justice,8 while the conspiracy’s third leader, Rhone-
Poulenc, S.A., avoided a criminal fine by cooperating in the DOJ’s 
investigation.9  Afterward, many of the conspiracy’s other 
participants also pleaded guilty and paid criminal fines.10  
Customers who purchased vitamins directly from the 
manufacturers sued and recovered damages under federal antitrust 
law,11 which permits only price fixed products’ direct purchasers to 
recover overcharges for price fixing violations.12  Indirect vitamin 
purchasers at multiple levels, such as brokers, distributors and, 
 
 8. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, F. Hoffman-La Roche and 
BASF Agree to Pay Record Criminal Fines for Participating in International 
Vitamin Cartel (May 20, 1999) (noting F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.’s $500 million 
fine and BASF AG’s $225  million  fine),  available   at   http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/press_releases/1999/2450.htm (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Five Executives, One Company 
Charged with Price Fixing and Agree to Cooperate in Investigation of Worldwide 
Vitamins Price Fixing Conspiracy (Mar. 2, 1999) (noting Lonza AG’s guilty plea 
and $10.5 million fine), available  at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
press_releases/1999/2266.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Press Release, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Three Japanese Companies Agree to Plead Guilty, Pay 
Criminal Fines, for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (Sept. 9, 1999) 
(noting Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd.’s guilty plea and $72 million fine, Eisai 
Co. Ltd.’s guilty plea and $40 million fine and Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.’s 
guilty plea and $25 million fine), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
press_releases/1999/3659.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Press Release, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Canadian Vitamin Company Agrees to Plead Guilty for 
Role in International Vitamin Cartel (Sept. 29, 1999) (noting Chinook Group 
Ltd.’s guilty plea and $5 million fine), available at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/atr/public/press_releases/1999/3726.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Press 
Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Two German Firms and Two U.S. 
Corporations Agree to Plead Guilty to Participating in International Vitamin 
Cartels (May 5, 2000) (noting Merck KgaA, Degussa-Huls AG, Nepera, Inc. and 
Reilly Industries Inc.’s guilty pleas and combined $33 million fine), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2002/ 4684.htm (last visited 
May 15, 2004).  Myriad individuals from these companies also pleaded guilty and 
paid fines personally. 
 11. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1285, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17369 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2000) (order approving settlement agreement with 
multiple Vitamins defendants). 
 12. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (discussed infra).  For a 
more complete discussion on federal, direct purchaser antitrust litigation, see 
Daniel R. Karon, Price Fixing, Market Allocation and Bid Rigging Conspiracies: How to 
Counsel Your Clients to Detect Violations and Inform You of Potential Claims, 25 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 241 (2001). 
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most of all, consumers, also sued under various states’ antitrust laws 
and recovered illegal overcharges passed on to them.13 
But in many states, indirect vitamin purchasers, namely 
consumers, have not recovered their overcharges.  This is because 
either these states’ courts have improperly ruled that consumers 
lack antitrust standing under their antitrust laws, or these states’ 
consumers did not realize they had valid price fixing claims 
because indirect purchaser antitrust claims have not traditionally 
been pursued there.  As a result, these states’ consumers remain 
uncompensated for being victimized by the vitamin manufacturers 
despite having possessed entirely valid, yet unrealized or wrongly 
denied, indirect purchaser antitrust claims.14 
This article will first examine the origin of indirect purchaser 
antitrust litigation.15  It will then explain how certain state antitrust 
statutes include specific language permitting indirect purchasers 
standing to pursue antitrust claims.16  Next, it will examine how 
courts in some states without specific indirect purchaser legislation 
have nonetheless interpreted their state antitrust statutes to confer 
indirect purchaser standing.17  This article will then demonstrate 
how additional states without specific indirect purchaser legislation 
also permit standing to indirect purchasers, yet these states’ 
consumers fail to realize these claims’ existence.18  Next, it will 
explain how some state courts have wrongly denied indirect 
purchaser antitrust standing to consumers when, under federal and 
state case law, as well as federalism principles, their state antitrust 
acts actually permit standing.19  Finally, this article will conclude 
that, despite established convention, thirty-nine (and arguably as 
many as forty-four) states, plus the District of Columbia, actually 
provide indirect purchasers some remedy for price fixing 
 
 13. See Master Settlement Agreement 15, Schedule A (Jan. 22, 2001), available 
at http://www.vitaminlitigation.com/MASTERSETTLEMENT.pdf (last visited May 
15, 2004) (noting the $225,250,000 settlement on behalf of indirect purchasers in 
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
West Virginia and Wisconsin as states and areas where indirect purchasers have 
recovered for illegal overcharges resulting from the defendants’ conspiracy). 
 14. Unfortunately, the statutes of limitations have run on all these states’ 
antitrust acts. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Parts V, VI. 
 19. See infra Part VII. 
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violations.20 
II. FEDERAL LAW PERMITS STATES TO PROTECT  
INDIRECT PURCHASERS 
Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act21 prohibits any 
agreement among competitors to restrain trade, including 
agreements to fix prices and allocate markets.  The Clayton Act of 
1914 gives the U.S. district courts jurisdiction to “prevent and 
restrain violations of [the Sherman Act].”22 Until 1977, both direct 
and indirect purchasers were permitted to sue under the Clayton 
Act for Sherman Act violations.23  In 1968, however, indirect 
purchaser standing began to erode.  In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp.,24 a shoe-making machinery manufacturer 
defended a monopoly claim on the basis that the plaintiff, a shoe 
manufacturer that bought its machinery, had passed on the entire 
monopoly overcharge to the plaintiff’s customers; as a result, the 
plaintiff had not been injured.25  The United States Supreme Court 
ultimately held an antitrust defendant could not defend a damages 
suit on the basis that the plaintiff had shifted the cost of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing to the plaintiff’s customers.26 
While Hanover Shoe foreclosed pass-on damages’ “defensive 
use” in antitrust cases, their “offensive use” was considered ten 
years later in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.27  In Illinois Brick, plaintiffs 
brought suit against concrete block manufacturers alleging 
defendants “had engaged in a combination and conspiracy to fix 
the prices of concrete block in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.”28  But consistent with (yet the reverse of) its Hanover 
Shoe ruling, the Court held indirect purchasers could not maintain 
 
 20. See infra Part VIII. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003). 
 22. Id. § 4. 
 23. Before Illinois Brick, six of the seven federal courts of appeals that 
considered this issue held indirect purchasers could recover damages for antitrust 
violations.  See, e.g., In re W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 
1973); W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 24. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
 25. Id. at 487-88. 
 26. Id. at 494. 
 27. 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977) (“Having decided [in Hanover Shoe] that in 
general a pass-on theory may not be used defensively by an antitrust violator 
against a direct purchaser plaintiff, we must now decide whether that theory may 
be used offensively by an indirect purchaser plaintiff against an alleged violator.”). 
 28. Id. at 726-27. 
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an action for a Sherman Act violation when alleging that 
defendants’ illegal overcharges had been passed on to them.29  The 
Court’s main bases for its decision were that lawsuits involving both 
direct and indirect purchasers might create multiple liability risks 
for defendants30 and that such actions would be overly 
complicated.31  With this ruling, indirect purchasers could no 
longer maintain federal lawsuits for damages caused by Sherman 
Act violations.32 
In reaching its result, the majority, in an opinion written by 
Justice White, declined to follow the U.S. Justice Department, 
which had urged the door be left open for indirect purchaser 
suits.33  Three dissenting Justices agreed with the Justice 
Department.  Justice Brennan wrote that the majority had ignored 
antitrust law’s fundamental policy to compensate victims: 
[Hanover Shoe’s] same policies of insuring the continued 
effectiveness of the treble-damages action and preventing 
wrongdoers from retaining the spoils of their misdeeds 
favor allowing indirect purchasers to prove that 
overcharges were passed on to them.34 
Lack of precision in apportioning damages between direct 
and indirect purchasers is thus plainly not a convincing 
reason for denying indirect purchasers an opportunity to 
prove their injuries and damages.  Moreover, from the 
deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages 
are paid, so long as someone redresses the violation.  
Antitrust violators are equally deterred whether the 
 
 29. Id. at 727-28. 
 30. Id. at 730. 
 31. Id. at 731-32.  The Court also added its belief that “the antitrust laws will 
be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge 
in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected 
by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it.”  Id. 
at 735. 
 32. Although this article describes the issue as one relating to “standing,” 
debate exists as to whether Illinois Brick is concerned with standing or the 
definition of “injury.”  As the Illinois Brick Court noted, who has standing and who 
has sustained injury are “analytically distinct,” and Illinois Brick’s precise holding 
was that the direct purchaser, not the indirect purchaser, was the one “injured” for 
purposes of federal antitrust law.  Id. at 728 n.7.  While this analytical distinction 
exists, these two concepts merge for practical purposes, and the word “standing” is 
generally used to denote a person who has sustained an injury sufficient to give 
rise to an actionable Clayton Act claim for a Sherman Act violation. 
 33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, passim, Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404). 
 34. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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judgments against them are in favor of direct or indirect 
purchasers.  Hanover Shoe said as much.35 
Justice Blackmun, another dissenter, wrote that the Court’s 
opinion adopted “a wooden approach . . . entirely inadequate when 
considered in the light of the objectives of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts.”36 
Illinois Brick immediately generated major controversy as the 
Court’s concerns about multiple liability and overly complex 
litigation proved unfounded.  Courts realized they were “fully 
capable of ensuring antitrust defendants are not forced to pay 
more in damages than amounts to which the injured parties are 
entitled.”37  They noted the “absence of cases in which . . . court[s 
were] faced with the impossible task of apportioning damages,”38 
and that “[t]here [were] few, if any, reported instances of a 
defendant paying treble damages to two different classes of 
purchasers based on a single antitrust violation.”39  Courts further 
recognized “[c]omplexity [was] not a foreign concept in the world 
of antitrust”40  and “[t]he day [was] long past when courts . . . 
[would] deny relief to a deserving plaintiff merely because of 
procedural difficulties or problems of apportioning damages.”41 
Even Congress recognized the Court’s overreaction to the 
potential for complexity: 
The House Report on H.R. 11942 . . . concluded that the 
Court had overstated the problem of complexity in Illinois 
Brick.  The Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report on S. 
1874, acknowledged the difficulty of proving pass-on but 
 
 35. Id. at 759-60. 
 36. Id. at 766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 37. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 449-50 (Iowa 2002) 
[hereinafter Comes]; see also Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680, 687 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1996) [hereinafter Hyde] (“We find that a slight risk of multiple liability is 
greatly outweighed by the benefit of advancing the aforementioned policies of 
[North Carolina’s Antitrust Act].”). 
 38. Comes, supra note 37, at 451. 
 39. Id. at 449 (quoting Hyde, 473 S.E.2d at 687). 
 40. Id. at 451. 
 41. Id.  Accord Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 109 (Ariz. 
2003) [hereinafter Bunker’s] (noting “courts can manage the complexity of 
indirect purchaser recovery in antitrust cases . . . .”).  Many commentators have 
also criticized Illinois Brick for its bad public policy.  See Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth 
Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 
62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437 passim (2001); Kevin J. O’Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall 
Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34, 34-35, 37-38 (2001); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 passim (1999). 
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concluded that this difficulty did not justify ignoring the 
important rights of indirect purchasers.  The Senate 
Committee also concluded that the courts or the 
legislature could solve any procedural and judicial 
management problems.  In its report on the Rodino-
Kennedy bill, the Senate Committee again rejected the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that apportioning damages 
between plaintiffs was too complex a task for courts to 
handle, based on their performance in the period 
between Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.  The Committee 
observed that judicial functions in a wide variety of cases 
outside the antitrust area were no less complex than those 
inherent in pass-on cases.42 
But despite its controversy, the Illinois Brick ruling never 
purported to limit applying state antitrust laws to parties indirectly 
injured by antitrust violations.  The United States Supreme Court 
expressed this proposition twelve years later in California v. ARC 
America Corp.43 where, in another opinion written by Justice White, 
the Court unanimously held that states had the right to enact and 
enforce laws permitting indirect purchasers to recover for antitrust 
violations.44  As amici curiae, thirty-eight state attorneys general also 
supported this position that state law should fill in the indirect 
purchaser void.45 
In ARC America, plaintiffs, four states, were indirect purchasers 
of cement and concrete used for state projects.46  Plaintiffs filed 
antitrust actions involving this cement and concrete, in part, under 
their respective state antitrust statutes, seeking damages for 
defendants’ price fixing.47  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
the four state antitrust laws were preempted because they 
 
 42. Cynthia Urda Kassis, The Indirect Purchaser’s Right to Sue Under Section 4 of 
the Clayton Act: Another Congressional Response to Illinois Brick, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 
1116 (1983). 
 43. 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
 44. Id. at 105-06; see also Comes, supra note 37, at 444 (“[ARC America] held 
nothing in the Sherman Act or in Illinois Brick prevents the states from allowing 
indirect purchasers to bring antitrust actions, even if this results in multiple 
recoveries.”) (footnote omitted). 
 45. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 95; see also Brief of Thirty-Five States and the District 
of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, State of California v. ARC 
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1987) (No. 87-1862). 
 46. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 96. 
 47. Id. at 98.  (Plaintiffs’ “claims under these state indirect purchaser statutes 
are the focus of this case.”). 
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conflicted with Illinois Brick’s Sherman Act interpretation.48 
As a starting point, the Court noted Congress has the authority 
to preempt state law.49  If Congress has not expressly preempted an 
area of state law, it can impliedly do so under two circumstances: 
First, when Congress intends that federal law occupy a 
given field, state law in that field is pre-empted.  Second, 
even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is 
nevertheless pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts 
with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state 
and federal law is impossible, or when the state law “stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”50 
The Court then instructed that for the defendants to 
successfully argue that federal law had preempted the states’ 
indirect purchaser laws (meaning only direct purchasers could sue 
for antitrust violations), they had to first overcome the 
presumption against finding state law preemption in areas 
traditionally regulated by the states: 
When Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied 
by the States, “we start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Given the long 
history of state common-law and statutory remedies 
against monopolies and unfair business practices, it is 
plain that this is an area traditionally regulated by the 
States.51 
The Court further highlighted that “[a]t the time of the 
enactment of the Sherman Act, 21 States had already adopted their 
own antitrust laws,” and that “the Sherman Act itself, in the words 
of Senator Sherman, ‘[did] not announce a new principle of law, 
but applie[d] old and well recognized principles of the common 
law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal 
Government.’”52 
State indirect purchaser statutes, the Court explained, “are 
consistent with the broad purposes of the federal antitrust laws: 
 
 48. In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
 49. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 100. 
 50. Id. at 100-01 (citations omitted). 
 51. Id. at 101 (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. at n.4. 
9
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deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation 
of victims of that conduct,”53 and “nothing in Illinois Brick suggests 
that it would be contrary to congressional purposes for States to 
allow indirect purchasers to recover under their own antitrust 
laws.”54  The Court further explained, “it is plain that this is an area 
traditionally regulated by the States,”55 and that Illinois Brick was 
limited to construing federal, not state, law’s application: 
When viewed properly, Illinois Brick was a decision 
construing the federal antitrust laws, not a decision 
defining the interrelationship between the federal and 
state antitrust laws. The congressional purposes on which 
Illinois Brick was based provide no support for a finding 
that state indirect purchaser statutes are pre-empted by 
federal law.56 
The Court concluded, “Congress intended the federal 
antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust 
remedies,”57 and “the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
state indirect purchaser statutes [were] pre-empted.”58  With ARC 
America it was finally determined that indirect purchasers were not 
proscribed from pursuing price fixing claims under state antitrust 
laws.   
III. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT TOWARD INDIRECT  
PURCHASER STANDING 
As one court recently commented: 
[I]t is one thing to consider the congressional policies 
identified in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining 
what sort of recovery federal antitrust law authorizes; it is 
something altogether different, and in our view 
inappropriate, to consider them as defining what federal 
law allows States to do under their own antitrust law.59   
 
 53. Id. at 102; see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 
123 F.3d 599, 611 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Antitrust law . . . is a field in which Congress 
has not sought to replace state with federal law.”) (citation omitted). 
 54. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 103. 
 55. Id. at 101. 
 56. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. at 102. 
 58. Id. at 101. 
 59. Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., No. M2000-1850-COA-R9-CV, 2003 Tenn. 
Ct. App. LEXIS 539, at *80 (July 31, 2003) [hereinafter Sherwood] (emphasis 
added); see also Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) (“[I]ssues such as whether deterrence, compensation, or efficient 
10
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Not surprisingly, then, in Illinois Brick’s wake, several states 
passed so-called Illinois Brick “repealer statutes” explicitly permitting 
damage actions by or on behalf of indirect purchasers, including 
ultimate consumers.  Presently, twenty-five states and the District of 
Columbia’s antitrust acts contain repealer statutes permitting 
either their states’ consumers or attorneys general as parens patriae 
to pursue indirect purchaser price fixing claims.60  Washington’s 
consumer fraud act permits its attorney general to sue for 
consumers’ price fixing damages as parens patriae,61 and 
Massachusetts,62 Nebraska,63 Vermont,64 Florida65 and New Jersey66 
 
judicial administration should be promoted by antitrust laws and whether and to 
what extent these goals can or should be harmonized are fundamental policy 
decisions for the legislature of each state.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
 60. ALA. CODE § 6-5-60 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577 (Michie 2003) 
(authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-315 
(Michie 2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 16750 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-111 (2003) (authorizing 
attorney general action as parens patriae); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4509 (2003); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 480-13 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 48-113 (2003); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
10/7 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-161 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104 (West 2003); MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW I § 11-209 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens 
patriae); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.778 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2003); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-821 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 
598A.160 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 57-1-3 (Michie 2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 340 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-08.1-08 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 
646.780 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 6-36-12 (2003) (authorizing attorney general action as parens patriae); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (Michie 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2465 (2003); W. VA. 
CODE ST. R. §§ 142-9-1, 142-9-2 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 133.18 (2003). 
  Moreover, in FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc. (Mylan II), 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11 
(D.D.C. 1999), Judge Thomas Hogan, the judge who presided over In re Vitamins 
Antitrust Litigation, ruled that Illinois Brick did not preclude the Alaska, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and West Virginia attorneys general 
from seeking restitution or damages resulting from price fixing on behalf of 
consumers under these states’ consumer protection or unfair trade practices 
statutes.  Judge Hogan also held that Washington’s damages claim for indirect 
purchasers was limited to state governmental entity purchasers.  Id. passim. 
 61. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.080 (2003); see also Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 938 
P.2d 842, 847 (1997) (“If direct purchasers decide not to sue, the indirect 
purchaser is not entirely without a remedy.  While a private plaintiff must ‘be 
injured in his or her business or property’ in order to bring any suit under the Act, 
this requirement does not exist in the section of the Act that enables actions by the 
attorney general.”). 
 62. Ciardi v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 762 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Mass. 2002). 
 63. Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 267 Neb. 586, [7], No. S-01-1325, 2004 Neb. 
LEXIS 43, *22 (2004). 
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courts have ruled indirect purchasers can pursue damages claims 
for antitrust violations under their states’ consumer protection 
statutes.  And importantly, courts in four non-repealer states, 
Arizona,67 Iowa,68 North Carolina69 and Tennessee,70 have ruled 
indirect purchasers have standing to pursue damage claims under 
their states’ antitrust statutes.71 
All told, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, which 
represent about seventy percent of our nation’s population, 
provide some claim for indirect purchasers.72  This leaves seventeen 
states: eight where courts have specifically ruled, albeit wrongly, 
against indirect purchaser standing;73 and nine where the issue has 
not yet been decided.  Of the latter nine states, two do not have 
 
 64. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 817 A.2d 9, 18-20 (Vt. 2002) (noting indirect 
purchasers can also sue under Vermont’s antitrust statute). 
 65. Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 66. Cement Masons Local Union No. 699 v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 431-99, slip 
op. at 10-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2000) (order denying motion to dismiss 
consumer fraud claim on behalf of consumer indirect purchasers).  But see Wilson 
v. General Motors Corp., No. L-1287-03, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003) 
(order dismissing plaintiff’s consumer fraud claim for indirect purchaser price 
fixing injury); Kieffer v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. BER-L-365-99-EM, 1999 WL 
1567726 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 1999) (letter opinion holding indirect purchasers 
lack standing under New Jersey’s antitrust and consumer fraud acts). 
 67. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 110. 
 68. Comes, supra note 37, at 451. 
 69. Hyde, supra note 37, at 688. 
 70. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *115; Blake v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 03AO1-
9509-CV-00307, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184, at *19 (Mar. 27, 1996). 
 71. Consumers have also sought to recover their antitrust overcharges by 
alleging defendants’ unjust enrichment.  See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 
105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (denying defendants’ motion to 
dismiss consumers’ class action unjust enrichment claims for overcharges under 
various states’ laws); Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., No. C34355-L, 
slip op. at 2 (Law Court Sullivan Cty., Kingsport, Tenn. July 15, 2002) 
(“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is overruled and denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ 
[sic] claim and cause of action on the theory of unjust enrichment under 
Tennessee law.”). 
 72. O’Connor, supra note 41, at 35.  For additional discussion on the number 
of indirect states, see Thomas Greene, Kevin O’Connor & Robert L. Hubbard, 
State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, 1252 PLI/CORP. 1129, 1152-1156 (2001).  
 73. See Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2002); Berghausen v. 
Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Arnold v. Microsoft Corp., 
No. 2000-CA-002144-MR, 2001 WL 1835377 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001); Duvall v. 
Silvers, Asher, Sher & McLaren, M.D.’s, Neurology, P.C., 998 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1999); Minuteman, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 795 A.2d 833 (N.H. 2002)); 
Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 802 N.E.2d 712 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) [hereinafter 
Johnson]; Major v. Microsoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. No. 3 2002); 
Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1995). 
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antitrust acts74 and one state’s antitrust act does not apply to price 
fixing.75  The remaining six non-repealer states,76 however, actually 
permit indirect purchaser antitrust claims, yet the states’ consumers 
have to date failed to recognize these claims’ existence and have 
failed to assert their rights to pursue them.77 
IV. NON-REPEALER STATES THAT PERMIT INDIRECT PURCHASERS TO 
PURSUE PRICE FIXING CASES UNDER THEIR ANTITRUST LAWS 
Just because a state legislature has not enacted specific 
“repealer legislation” does not mean its consumers cannot pursue 
antitrust cases for damages caused by price fixing.  This is, in part, 
because many state antitrust laws already provide indirect 
purchasers standing even absent specific repealer legislation. 
A.  Iowa: Comes v. Microsoft Corp. 
In Comes v. Microsoft Corp.,78 “[a] group of consumers filed suit 
alleging Microsoft maintained or used a monopoly in conjunction 
with its Windows 98 operating system for the purpose of excluding 
competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in 
violation of the Iowa Competition Law [its antitrust act].”79  On 
 
 74. Georgia and Pennsylvania. 
 75. Wyoming’s antitrust laws provide private remedies for only a few civil 
offenses, which do not include price fixing.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-114 
(Michie 2003). 
 76. Louisiana, South Carolina, Montana, Utah, Virginia and Delaware. 
 77. However, in In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, 205 F.R.D. 
369, 374 (D.D.C. 2002), which involved attorneys general, consumers, and the 
FTC’s lawsuits against defendant drug manufacturers for violating various federal 
and state antitrust laws by monopolizing the markets for the generic anti-anxiety 
drugs Lorazepam and Clorazepate, the court actually granted final class action 
settlement approval to all plaintiffs’ claims.  The court explained that consumers 
“in twenty states—Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin . . . have specific indirect purchaser statutes or case 
law permitting private parties to sue” and approved indirect purchasers’ claims in 
the “thirty-one other states—Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming” as well.  Id.  The court further approved all 
fifty states’ attorneys general settlements, pursuant to the attorneys general’s parens 
patriae authority to pursue state consumer antitrust claims.  Id. at 386-88. 
 78. Comes, supra note 37.   
 79. Id. at 441. 
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appeal, “[t]he only issue [was] whether the United States Supreme 
Court case, Illinois Brick, should be followed in interpreting the 
Iowa Competition Law.”80  The consumer-plaintiffs urged the court 
to find that federal law did not control Iowa’s antitrust law and that 
indirect purchasers could sue under it.81 
As a starting point, the Iowa Supreme Court noted the “very 
broad category of persons [permitted] to maintain a suit in [Iowa] 
state courts for damages resulting from anticompetitive conduct.  
‘[A] person who is injured . . . by conduct prohibited under this 
chapter may bring suit to: . . . [r]ecover actual damages resulting 
from conduct prohibited under this chapter.’”82  The court 
believed Iowa’s antitrust statute was “clear on its face,”83 and the 
words “a person” permitted indirect purchasers to sue for 
violations: 
This statute does not restrict the class of persons who may 
bring suit under the Iowa Competition Law.  Nothing in 
the statute says in order to seek redress for antitrust 
violations a purchaser must be directly injured.  The 
legislature did not specifically limit standing to direct 
purchasers, but instead it simply authorized “[a] person 
who is injured” to sue.  Legislative intent is determined by 
what the legislature said, not by what it did not say or 
might have said.  Therefore, we do not regard our 
legislature’s failure to explicitly authorize indirect 
purchasers to maintain a suit for antitrust violations as an 
expression of its agreement with Illinois Brick.  Given the 
clear, broad language of the state antitrust law, we 
conclude the Iowa Competition Law creates a cause of 
action for all consumers, regardless of one’s technical 
status as a direct or indirect purchaser.84 
Despite the statute’s plain meaning, Microsoft argued that 
Iowa’s Competition Law did not permit indirect purchasers redress 
because Iowa’s legislature had “mandated that the Iowa 
Competition Law shall be construed to complement federal  
law . . . . Therefore, . . . Iowa [was] bound by the federal law 
[namely Illinois Brick].”85  To support this argument, Microsoft 
 
 80. Id. at 442. 
 81. Id. at 441. 
 82. Id. at 443 (emphasis added); see also IOWA CODE § 553.12 (2003). 
 83. Comes, supra note 37, at 445. 
 84. Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted). 
 85. Id. at 445-46. 
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relied on the Iowa Competition Law’s “harmonization” clause, 
which instructs: 
This chapter shall be construed to complement and be 
harmonized with the applied laws of the United States 
which have the same or similar purpose as this chapter.  
This construction shall not be made in such a way as to 
constitute a delegation of state authority to the federal 
government, but shall be made to achieve uniform 
application of the state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of 
economic activity and monopolistic practices.86 
But the court found that this provision did not require Iowa 
courts to interpret Iowa’s Competition Law the same way federal 
courts have interpreted federal law.87  The court explained the issue 
was not preemption, in that “Congress intended federal antitrust 
laws to supplement, not displace state antitrust remedies.”88  
Because Illinois Brick construed only federal antitrust law, “it did not 
define the connection, if any, between federal and state antitrust 
laws.”89  The court instructed instead that “the ‘concept of 
federalism assumes power, and duty, of independence in 
interpreting [a state’s] own organic law.’”90  Because federal law did 
not preempt it, the court construed the Iowa Competition Law to 
encourage antitrust law’s primary goal.91 
In construing the Competition Law’s harmonization clause, 
the court did not believe the clause was aimed at defining who 
could sue under the Competition Law, but was instead intended to 
achieve the state and federal laws’ uniform application prohibiting 
monopolistic practices: 
The purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is 
to apply a uniform standard of conduct so that businesses 
will know what is acceptable conduct and what is not 
acceptable conduct.  To achieve this uniformity or 
predictability, we are not required to define who may sue 
in our state courts in the same way federal courts have 
defined who may maintain an action in federal court.  
Rather, our guiding principle in interpreting the Iowa 
 
 86. Id. at 446; see also IOWA CODE § 553.2 (2003). 
 87. Comes, supra note 37, at 446. 
 88. Id. (citing Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 967 
(E.D. Wis. 1998)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (citing Pool v. Super. Ct., 677 P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984)). 
 91. Id. 
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Competition Law is to do so in such way as to prohibit 
“restraints of economic activity and monopolistic 
conduct.”  Harmonizing our construction and 
interpretation of state law as to what conduct is governed 
by the law satisfies the harmonization provision.92 
The court also acknowledged the consistency between the 
policies underlying Iowa’s Competition Law and federal antitrust 
law: 
The United States Supreme Court [in ARC America] has 
held that two statutes, both of which prohibit 
anticompetitive conduct, are not inconsistent merely 
because one allows indirect purchasers to sue for damages 
while the other does not.  The federal antitrust statute 
shows Congress’ concern with the protection of 
competition, not competitors.  The goal of federal 
antitrust law is to prohibit restraint of economic activity 
and monopolistic practices.  Our state antitrust law 
promotes the same consumer protection policies as does 
federal antitrust law by “assuring customers the benefits of 
price competition.”  In order for us to agree with 
Microsoft that the harmonization statute requires us to 
prohibit suits by indirect consumers, we must accept the 
fact that real victims—those who purchase goods and pay 
the overcharge—cannot recover. This result would 
overwhelmingly defeat the purpose of the Iowa 
Competition Law.  Consumers in this state are best 
protected by permitting all injured purchasers to bring 
suit against those who violate our antitrust laws.93 
Importantly, the court also considered the legislature’s 
purpose and intent at the time the Iowa Competition Law was 
enacted: 
The Iowa legislature passed the current Iowa Competition 
Law one year before the decision in Illinois Brick.  
Consequently, it was impossible for the legislature to have 
adopted a judicial construction which did not exist at that 
time.  The legislature did not have the opportunity to 
discuss Illinois Brick and accept or reject its law before 
passing the Iowa Competition Law.94 
Further, because Iowa “took its cues” from federal law when 
 
 92. Id. (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at 447 (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Id. (emphasis added). 
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creating its Competition Law, it was significant that “[p]rior to 
Illinois Brick, most federal courts construed section four of the 
Clayton Act to allow suits by indirect purchasers,”95  and that “even 
the United States Supreme Court prior to Illinois Brick consistently 
recognized Congress’ intent in enacting section four of the Clayton 
Act was to protect all victims of antitrust infringements.”96 
Mindful of this chronology, the court appreciated that 
“[w]hen the Iowa legislature enacted the Iowa Competition Law, it 
did so considering the federal law prior to Illinois Brick, which 
allowed indirect purchasers to bring antitrust suits.”97  The federal 
law’s status before Illinois Brick formed still further support for the 
court’s conclusion that “the Iowa legislature intended indirect 
purchasers to have standing under the Iowa Competition Law.”98 
Finally, the court realized the Illinois Brick Court was primarily 
concerned with policy considerations such as multiple liability and 
litigation complexity that had “not materialized,” and which had 
“little, if any, applicability to antitrust suits in state court.”99  The 
court observed “few, if any, reported instances of a defendant 
paying treble damages to two different classes of purchasers based 
on a single antitrust violation,”100 and that “courts [were] fully 
capable of ensuring antitrust defendants are not forced to pay 
more in damages than amounts to which the injured parties are 
entitled.”101 
The court likewise explained “[c]omplexity is not a foreign 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 447-48 (citing Kassis, supra note 42, at 1098); see also Radovich v. 
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1958) (finding that antitrust laws 
protected victims, as well as the public, and courts should not burden private 
litigants with additional requirements in a case in which plaintiff sued under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act, alleging defendants had conspired to monopolize 
professional football); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 
U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (finding that the statute did not confine its protection to 
consumers, purchasers, competitors, or sellers, but that its terms and coverage 
were comprehensive, “protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden 
practices” in case where sugar beet growers sued sugar refiners and distributors 
under the Sherman Act for price fixing); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 
U.S. 251, 264-66 (1946) (in Sherman and Clayton Acts claim for monopolistic 
practices involving exhibiting motion pictures, explaining that to require plaintiffs 
to demonstrate specific damages where defendants have made it difficult to do so 
would induce more grievous wrongdoing). 
 97. Comes, supra note 37, at 448. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 449. 
 100. Id. (quoting Hyde, supra note 37, at 685). 
 101. Id. at 449-50 (citing Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 1130). 
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concept in the world of antitrust,” 102 and “there [was] an absence 
of cases in which [courts had been] faced with the impossible task 
of apportioning damages.”103  The court acknowledged even 
Congress’ belief that the Illinois Brick Court had overstated the 
potential for complex litigation.104  “We should not defeat the ends 
of justice simply because the litigation may be complicated,”105 
reasoned the court, and difficulty proving pass-on damages did not 
justify ignoring indirect purchasers’ rights since courts can typically 
resolve any management problems that might arise during 
litigation.106  With these considerations in mind, as well as the 
Illinois Brick Court’s concession that allowing indirect purchaser 
suits ultimately resulted in no redress for the indirect purchaser 
actually injured by paying an overcharge,107 the Comes court held 
Iowa’s “antitrust law contemplate[d] all injured consumers [were] 
authorized to bring suit to enforce [Iowa’s] antitrust laws,”108 and 
the class had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.109 
B.  Arizona: Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC 
Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC110 involved two consolidated 
class action antitrust cases brought by indirect purchasers against 
various flat glass manufacturers and tobacco manufacturers.111  The 
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed both trial courts’ orders 
dismissing the indirect purchasers’ antitrust claims,112 and the 
Arizona Supreme Court “granted Defendants’ petitions for review 
to resolve whether indirect purchasers may sue under the Arizona 
Antitrust Act.”113 
 
 102. Comes, supra note 37, at 451. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (citing Kassis, supra note 42, at 1116 (“The House Report on H.R. 
11942, . . . concluded that the Court had overstated the problem of complexity in 
Illinois Brick[, and t]he Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report on S. 1874, 
acknowledged the difficulty of proving pass-on but concluded that this difficulty 
did not justify ignoring the important rights of indirect purchasers.”)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 450 (citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746). 
 108. Id. at 451. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 75 P.3d 99 (Ariz. 2003). 
 111. Id. at 101. 
 112. Id.; see also Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 1130; Gray v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 
Civ A. C2000078, slip op. (Ariz. Feb. 28, 2001). 
 113. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102. 
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The court began its discussion by noting the “case turn[ed] 
upon the interpretation of a provision of the Arizona Antitrust Act 
that permits a ‘person’ to sue to redress an antitrust injury.”114  
Considering the Act’s “plain language,”115 the court “define[d] 
‘person’ as including ‘an individual’ ”116 and observed “[n]othing in 
this language restrict[ed] the right of action to direct purchasers 
injured by violations of the Arizona Antitrust Act or preclude[d] 
indirect purchasers from suing.”117  “[B]y defining the term 
‘person’ to include an ‘individual,’ ” explained the court, “the 
legislature signaled its intent to allow indirect purchasers to sue, 
because individuals are rarely direct purchasers.”118 
Defendants, however, argued strict adherence to Illinois Brick 
precluded plaintiffs from pursuing their antitrust claims.119  But the 
court disagreed, noting first that Arizona’s Antitrust Act was 
enacted “three years before Illinois Brick was decided,” and that 
Arizona courts are instructed that they “may use as a guide 
interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal 
antitrust statutes.”120 
Employing the Arizona Antitrust Act’s liberal “federal 
guidance clause,”121 the court further disagreed that the Arizona 
Legislature had “direct[ed] the court to follow the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Illinois Brick.”122  The court did “not read the 
federal guidance clause as manifesting a legislative intent to rigidly 
follow federal precedent on every issue of antitrust law regardless of 
whether differing concerns and interests exist in the state and 
federal systems.”123  Instead, the word “may” made applying Illinois 
Brick “permissive rather than mandatory.”124  The court reiterated 
that the guidance clause “evince[d] no specific legislative intent to 
prohibit indirect purchaser actions because the guidance clause 
was [also] enacted before Illinois Brick was decided,” and the only 
“specific case law regarding indirect purchasers [the legislature 
could have had] in mind when it included the guidance clause . . . 
 
 114. Id.; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1408 (2003). 
 115. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102. 
 116. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1401). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1412 (2003). 
 122. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 102-03. 
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would have been . . . [cases] permitting indirect purchaser suits 
[because that] was the prevailing rule nationwide before the Court 
decided Illinois Brick.”125 
The court further noted the Arizona Attorney General had 
historically interpreted the Act as providing indirect purchaser 
claims and had “brought several actions on behalf of the state and 
its agencies for harm incurred as an indirect purchaser.”126  These 
actions, the court believed, “reflect[ed] the state policy of 
accepting the benefits of indirect purchaser lawsuits and protecting 
Arizona taxpayers in their role as indirect purchasers.”127 
Citing Comes, the court agreed the guidance clause’s goal was 
“uniformity in the standard of conduct required, [and] not 
necessarily in procedural matters such as who may bring an action 
for injuries caused by violations of the standard of conduct.”128  The 
court also confirmed that ARC America held “allowing state laws to 
protect indirect purchasers would not interfere with the federal 
antitrust policy examined in Illinois Brick . . . .”129 
The defendants next suggested that allowing indirect 
purchaser lawsuits was to “involve the court in ‘judicial activism’ ”130 
and argued the only valid way to avoid applying Illinois Brick was by 
specific repealer statute.131  But the court did “not view [its] 
rejection of Illinois Brick as judicial activism because the legislature 
[had] specifically granted the right of action to indirect purchasers 
in § 44-1408 [of the Arizona Antitrust Act].”132  Accordingly, the 
court “simply reject[ed a] judicial interpretation of the parallel 
federal act that would prohibit suits by indirect purchasers despite 
the statutory language granting such a right of action,”133 
explaining: 
The Arizona statute broadly grants a right of action to any 
“person” injured in business or property by the anti-
competitive acts of another.  The Plaintiffs certainly fall 
within the definition of persons.  The complaints, which 
must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, 
 
 125. Id. at 103 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at 103 (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97-98 (1989)). 
 127. Id. at 106. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 106. 
 132. Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at 107. 
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allege that the Defendants’ illegal activity injured them in 
their business or property.  So why do the Plaintiffs not 
have a right of action according to Defendants?  Because 
the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick judicially limited the 
comparable federal statute.  In the absence of the federal 
guidance clause, Arizona’s statutory language would 
plainly include indirect purchasers.  Viewed against this 
background, Illinois Brick repealer statutes do not expand 
the right-of-action statutes, they simply reject a judicially 
imposed limitation on the right to sue originally granted 
by statute.  By refusing to construe the federal guidance 
clause as requiring that Arizona courts follow Illinois 
Brick’s limitation on the scope of the right of action 
granted by the legislature, the court is simply choosing to 
follow the expressed legislative intent that persons injured in their 
business or property by anti-competitive activity have a right of 
action.  The court defers to the legislature, not the federal 
courts, to create exceptions to the rule.134 
The defendants also sought to “use the Illinois Brick repealer 
statutes as the standard for uniformity, asserting that uniformity 
mandate[d] that the court leave it to the legislature to depart from 
federal law.”135  The court believed this argument “elevate[d] form 
over substance,”136 and instead explained that “[t]he law in most of 
the states that have considered the issue provides that indirect 
purchasers may bring a private action,”137 and “[t]he importance of 
uniformity [lay] in the rule of law, not in how that law came into 
effect.”138 
Finally, considering defendants’ “multiple liability” argument, 
the court believed the multiple liability risk was one the trial courts 
were competent to handle139 and that the courts were in the best 
position to solve the double-recovery problem.140  As for 
“complexity,” the court explained “[t]he complexity of proving 
damages through multiple levels of sales [was] a daunting task, but 
one to which [its] courts [were] equal,”141 and it “[could not] 
say . . . that damages to indirect purchasers [were] too speculative 
 
 134. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 135. Id. at 109. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 108. 
 140. Id. at 108. 
 141. Id. 
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because they [were] difficult to measure and prove.”142  Instead, 
history indicated that courts can manage complex indirect 
purchaser recovery in antitrust cases,143 and neither the court nor 
defendants could cite cases involving unresolvable complexity.144  
The court explained “recent developments in multistate litigation 
show[ed] that plaintiffs may be able to produce satisfactory proof 
of damages,”145 and “[a]llowing the courts to attempt to achieve 
justice in the antitrust realm comport[ed] with the longstanding 
policy of this state to protect consumers and deter anti-competitive 
behavior.”146 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellate courts’ decisions 
and remanded both cases to their respective trial courts for further 
proceedings.147 
C.  Tennessee: Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp. 
Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp.148 involved the identical consumer 
claim as Comes.  This time, Microsoft argued indirect purchasers 
had no claim under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act 
(Tennessee’s antitrust act).149 
The court first considered Illinois Brick and noted its 
application to antitrust injury and standing under federal antitrust 
law: 
 
 142. Id. (citing Edmund H. Mantell, Denial of a Forum to Indirect-Purchaser 
Victims of Price Fixing Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 
PACE L. REV. 153, 204-10 (1982) (presenting formula for calculating damages and 
arguing the suggested difficulties for such calculations are exaggerated); Robert 
G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A 
Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 315 (1979) (suggesting 
“reasonable estimation of passing on which will closely approximate the truth in 
the majority of cases requires no mystical powers or elaborate, extensive economic 
analysis”)).  The In re Vitamins Defendants’ Indirect Purchaser Master Settlement 
Agreement also demonstrates damages are not too complex to compute and 
allocate. 
 143. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 109. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.; see also In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657 N.W.2d 668, 679 (S.D. 
2003) (cited by Bunker’s, where the court noted virtually all courts considering 
indirect purchasers’ claims against Microsoft have upheld class certification based 
on plaintiffs’ testimony regarding proving pass-on damages). 
 146. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 110. 
 147. Id. 
 148. No. M2000-01850-COA-R9-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. July 31, 2003). 
 149. Id. at *2. 
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It is one thing to consider the congressional policies 
identified in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining 
what sort of recovery federal antitrust law authorizes; it is 
something altogether different, and in our view 
inappropriate, to consider them as defining what federal 
law allows States to do under their own antitrust law.150 
The court acknowledged Tennessee had not adopted an 
Illinois Brick repealer statute, and that the Tennessee General 
Assembly had sought to pass such legislation three times.151  The 
court also recognized that “proposed legislation, not enacted, 
ha[d] no consequence whatever upon the interpretation of an 
existing statute.”152 
The court then turned its attention to the Act’s language and 
the broad class of claimants to whom it applied: “[T]he law 
provides a civil remedy to ‘[a]ny person who is injured or damaged 
by such arrangement.’ ”153  Relying partly on Comes, the court took 
the term “any person” to “reflect[] an intent to protect and provide 
a remedy to individuals who are the ultimate consumers.”154 
As further support for its conclusion, the court considered the 
Sherman and Tennessee Acts’ purposes: 
While the purpose of the federal antitrust statutes is to 
protect competition and commerce, the state act’s 
purposes are to protect both commerce and the 
consuming public.  It is clear that the legislature intended 
that consumers, or ultimate purchasers, of goods be 
provided a remedy for any injury, including higher prices, 
sustained due to the prohibited anticompetitive conduct.  
There is no basis to presume that the legislature intended 
to protect only those consumers who purchased directly 
from the violator.  There is clear intent to the contrary. 
We hold that indirect purchasers are “persons” who may 
bring an action for an injury caused by violation of the 
TTPA.155 
 
 150. Id. at *82. 
 151. Id. at *86-87. 
 152. Id. at *87; see also Jo Ann Forman, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 
Inc., 13 S.W.3d 365, 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (indicating that the court was 
bound by Tennessee case law concerning the definition of the term “article” in the 
TTPA and was not permitted to broaden this term to cover plaintiffs’ claim despite 
three failed legislative attempts to broaden it). 
 153. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *98 (emphasis added) (quoting TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 47-25-106 (2003)). 
 154. Id. at *98. 
 155. Id. at *99. 
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The court also “weighed the policy concerns raised by the 
Court in Illinois Brick,”156 agreeing (i) “that allowing indirect 
purchasers to sue would not pose a risk of deterring lawsuits 
because of apportionment of recovery”157 because indirect 
purchasers would sue under state antitrust laws in state court and 
direct purchasers would sue under federal antitrust laws in federal 
court,158 and (ii) that courts found “concerns over complexity and 
apportionment less worrisome or inapplicable in the cases before 
them and were sympathetic to the arguments that indirect 
purchasers usually suffer the real loss.”159 
Accordingly, and consistent with its earlier Blake v. Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc.160 ruling, where the court also held indirect 
purchasers had standing to sue for damages under the Tennessee 
Antitrust Act,161 the court “conclude[d] that indirect purchasers 
such as Plaintiffs herein [could] sue for injury caused them by 
violation of the TTPA.”162 
D.  North Carolina: Hyde v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. 
In Hyde v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,163 plaintiffs, who were 
indirect purchasers from defendants, filed a class action alleging 
defendants had violated North Carolina’s antitrust laws by fixing 
infant formula wholesale prices.164  According to the North 
Carolina Antitrust Act: 
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, 
firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or 
injured by reason of any act or thing . . . in violation of the 
provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or 
corporation so injured shall have a right of action . . . .165 
Defendants argued that although the Act applied to “persons,” 
the “General Assembly somehow intended to exclude a large class 
 
 156. Id. at *101. 
 157. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 31. 
 158. One need merely observe the federal-direct purchaser Vitamins case and 
myriad state-indirect purchaser Vitamins cases to see this concept demonstrated.  
See supra notes 11 & 13. 
 159. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *101. 
 160. No. 03A01-9509-CV-00307, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 27, 1996). 
 161. Id. at *10. 
 162. Sherwood, supra note 59, at *103. 
 163. 473 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
 164. Id. at 681. 
 165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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of persons—indirect purchasers—from recovery for non-business 
injuries . . . .”166  The court, however, emphasized the General 
Assembly’s choice to include the phrase “any person” and that by 
doing so, “the General Assembly intended to provide a recovery for 
all consumers.”167 
While the defendants argued the court should interpret the 
Act consistent with Illinois Brick, the court noted that under North 
Carolina case law, “[f]ederal case law interpretations of the federal 
antitrust laws [were merely] persuasive authority in construing [its] 
own antitrust statutes.”168  Even the Bunker’s court recognized and 
found “instructive”169 that North Carolina and Tennessee lacked 
“federal guidance clause[s]”170 and had, accordingly, “rejected 
judicial attempts to constrict the range of persons injured by illegal 
activity who [could] maintain a state-law-based antitrust cause of 
action in state court.”171 
Like in Comes and Bunker’s, the court also explained that the 
most recent substantive change to the North Carolina Antitrust Act 
occurred in 1969, but that Illinois Brick was not decided until 1977.  
“It follows,” explained the court, “that [the] General Assembly 
could not have intended to adopt a judicial construction of [the 
Antitrust Act] which did not exist at the time of the revision.”172  
After all, “[i]t is a familiar canon of statutory construction that 
when a legislature borrows from the statutes of another legislative 
body, the provisions of that legislation should be construed as they 
were in the other jurisdiction at the time of their adoption.”173  
Accordingly, the court “consider[ed] as persuasive authority 
federal cases interpreting the federal antitrust laws as they existed 
in 1969.”174 
Defendants next argued that the “General Assembly’s failure 
to explicitly amend [the Act] to allow an indirect purchaser 
standing . . . demonstrate[d] that the General Assembly accepted 
 
 166. Hyde, supra note 37, at 684. 
 167. Id. (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 103. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Hyde, supra note 37, at 684. 
 173. Id. (citing Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994); Carolene Prods. 
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1944)). 
 174. Id. (listing the federal cases pre-Illinois Brick where indirect purchasers 
were granted standing to sue under the Clayton Act for Sherman Act violations). 
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the Illinois Brick rule.”175  But the court disagreed, citing Blake v. 
Abbott Laboratories and explaining, “the intent of the General 
Assembly may only be discerned by its actions, and not its failure to 
act.”176  As a result, the lack of “indirect purchaser” language in the 
Act was “of no consequence.”177 
Finally, the court agreed that the Illinois Brick Court’s concerns 
about multiple liability and complexity were groundless.178  
According to ARC America, Illinois Brick was “concerned solely with 
the construction of federal antitrust laws, and not at all with state 
courts’ constructions of state antitrust laws;”179 ARC America held 
that “no federal policy [existed] against states imposing liability in 
addition to that imposed by federal law”180 and that both direct and 
indirect purchasers had sufficient incentive to sue for antitrust 
violations.181  Since North Carolina’s state courts were “free to 
interpret [their] antitrust laws in a manner believe[d] to be most 
consistent with the purposes behind [them],”182 the court held 
indirect purchasers had standing under the North Carolina 
Antitrust Act to sue for price fixing violations.183 
V. NON-REPEALER STATES THAT PERMIT INDIRECT PURCHASERS 
TO PURSUE PRICE FIXING CLAIMS UNDER THEIR ANTITRUST LAWS, 
BUT WHERE CONSUMERS HAVE NEVER REALIZED 
OR PURSUED THEIR CLAIMS 
Like Iowa, Arizona, Tennessee and North Carolina, other 
states’ antitrust statutes also permit indirect purchasers to pursue 
price fixing claims, but those states’ consumers do not realize 
claims exist and, accordingly, have never pursued them. 
 
 175. Id. at 686. 
 176. Id. at 687. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Hyde, supra note 37 at 687. 
 179. Id. (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 688. 
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A.  Louisiana 
1.  Why the Louisiana Antitrust Act Permits Indirect Purchasers to 
Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing Violations 
The Louisiana Antitrust Act reads,  
Any person who is injured in his business or property by 
any person by reason of any act or thing forbidden by this 
Part may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and 
shall recover threefold the damages sustained by him [or 
her], the cost of suit, and a reasonable attorney’s fee.184 
Louisiana courts are instructed to “give effect to all parts of a 
statute and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes 
any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be 
avoided.”185  And “[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its 
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be 
applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in 
search of the intent of the legislature.”186 
The Louisiana Act’s plain wording does not exclude any class 
of “person injured,” nor require, much less suggest, a person must 
have been directly injured.  Instead, its plain language is all-
inclusive.  When considering this identical issue, the Comes, 
Bunker’s, Sherwood and Hyde courts, whose states’ antitrust statutes 
contain similar “person” language, all concluded “person” was 
unambiguous, all-inclusive, and meant indirect purchasers, and 
they all applied their states’ antitrust acts to them.187  The Louisiana 
Act’s subject is “any person,”188 and according to the Louisiana Civil 
Code, “[t]here are two kinds of persons: natural persons and 
juridical persons.  A natural person is a human being.”189  Given the 
Civil Code’s unambiguous definition, the Louisiana Act likewise 
applies to consumers. 
But despite the clarity of the term “persons,” if a Louisiana 
 
 184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:137 (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
 185. See, e.g., City of Pineville v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 
791 So. 2d 609, 612 (La. 2001). 
 186. Cleco Evangeline, LLC v. La. Tax Comm’n, 808 So. 2d 740, 744 (La. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 187. Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 107; Comes, supra note 37, at 445; Hyde, supra 
note 37; Sherwood, supra note 59, at *92; see also Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 817 A.2d 
9, 13 (Vt. 2002) (holding “any person” means indirect purchasers for purposes of 
Vermont’s consumer fraud act). 
 188. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:129 (2003). 
 189. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 24 (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
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court believed “person” was ambiguous, it would need to interpret 
this term.  “[T]he interpretation of a term within a statute is not 
merely a question of semantics, but requires an inquiry into the 
reason, purpose, context and legislative history of the statute as well 
as other laws relative to the same subject matter”:190   
The meaning and intent of a law is determined by 
considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the 
same subject matter, placing a construction on the 
provision in question that is consistent with the express 
terms of the law and with the obvious intent of 
the legislature enacting it.191   
“[B]ecause the rules of statutory construction require that the 
general intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting the law 
must, if possible, be given effect,”192 a Louisiana statute must “be 
applied ad [sic] interpreted in a manner which is consistent with 
logic and the presumed fair purpose and intention of the 
legislature in passing it.”193 
As the Comes, Bunker’s, and Hyde courts noted of their states’ 
antitrust statutes, the Louisiana Antitrust Act’s history reveals it was 
enacted at the same time as the Sherman Act—long before Illinois 
Brick was ever decided and during which time indirect purchasers 
had antitrust standing: 
A review of the legislative history of the Louisiana Anti-
trust Legislation reveals that the first legislation 
prohibiting trusts and conspiracies in restraint of trade 
and a prohibition of monopolies was passed by La. Acts 
No. 86 in 1890, the same year the federal Sherman 
Antitrust Act was enacted. Since that time the legislation 
has changed very little.  See Louisiana Power & Light v. 
United Gas Pipe Line, 493 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1986). 
It is apparent that the concerns which spurred the 
enactment of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act are the 
same as those which influenced Louisiana’s adoption of 
virtually identical antitrust legislation.194 
 
 190. Reppond v. City of Denham Springs, 572 So. 2d 224, 228 (La. Ct. App. 
1990). 
 191. City of Pineville v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 791 
So. 2d 609, 612 (La. 2001). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.; see also Board of Comm’rs v. S. D. Hunter Found., 354 So. 2d 156, 168 
(La. 1977) (holding that the district court’s statutory interpretation properly 
considered the legislature’s intention at the time it passed the statute). 
 194. Reppond, 572 So. 2d at 228. 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/6
KARON-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  8:56 PM 
2004] TEAR DOWN THAT ILLINOIS BRICK WALL 1379 
Given Illinois Brick’s nonexistence at the time the Louisiana Act 
was enacted and that indirect purchasers could freely pursue 
federal antitrust claims at that time, the Louisiana Legislature’s 
intent could not have been to preclude indirect purchasers from 
pursuing price fixing claims.  Authority suggesting such preclusion 
would not exist for almost another hundred years.  Because the 
Louisiana Legislature’s 1890 antitrust legislation did not specifically 
limit standing to direct purchasers (nor has it since, for that 
matter), the term “person” cannot be taken to preclude indirect 
purchasers, but must instead be read to include them.  Thus, if the 
term “any person” was even subject to judicial interpretation, the 
Act could only be taken to confer natural persons antitrust 
standing, as they had standing at the time the Louisiana Act was 
enacted. 
While a potential price fixing defendant may consider it 
noteworthy that Louisiana’s Legislature has chosen not to repeal 
the Illinois Brick decision, no need for such action existed 
considering the legislature’s intent.  The legislature’s 
understandable inaction contrasts markedly with the Tennessee 
Legislature’s, which “on three occasions [unsuccessfully] . . . sought 
to pass legislation to expressly confer standing on indirect 
purchasers.”195  Yet despite these three failed efforts, the Blake court 
believed “proposed legislation, not enacted, ha[d] no consequence 
whatever on the interpretation of an existing statute,”196 and it 
granted standing to indirect purchasers.  Because no similar efforts 
have ever been proposed to, much less rejected by, Louisiana’s 
Legislature, even more reason exists to interpret the Louisiana 
Antitrust Act as granting standing to indirect purchasers. 
Louisiana’s Antitrust Act also contains no harmonization 
clause.  Because its Act “is a counterpart to § 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Sherman Act should be a persuasive influence on the 
interpretation of our own state enactment.  However, the federal 
analysis is not controlling,”197 and Louisiana courts are nowhere 
 
 195. Blake, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184, at *9. 
 196. Id.; see also Hyde, supra note 37, at 687 (“The rule in North Carolina is 
clear that the intent of the General Assembly may only be discerned by its actions, 
and not its failure to act.”). 
 197. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So. 2d 
1149, 1158 (La. 1986) (emphasis added); accord State ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, 
Inc., 684 So. 2d 1024, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Sherman Act is a persuasive influence on the interpretation 
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required to mechanically invoke Illinois Brick to extinguish their 
consumers’ indirect purchaser price fixing claims. 
Finally, not to be forgotten is that Illinois Brick merely 
instructed that indirect purchasers could not pursue price fixing 
claims under the federal antitrust laws.198  Illinois Brick said nothing 
as to whether indirect purchasers could sue under state antitrust 
laws.  Instead, ARC America addressed this issue and held indirect 
purchasers could pursue state antitrust claims and that doing so did 
not conflict with prevailing federal law.  In this respect, construing 
the Louisiana Antitrust Act as permitting indirect purchasers to 
pursue price fixing claims is actually consistent with, not contrary 
to, federal law. 
2.  Why Free v. Abbott Laboratories and FTC v. Mylan 
Laboratories, Inc. Do Not Preclude Louisiana Indirect 
Purchaser Standing 
In Free v. Abbott Laboratories,199 Judge John Parker concluded 
that “Louisiana would be on sound ground in following the lead of 
the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick and [held] that 
these indirect purchasers have suffered no antitrust damage under 
Louisiana’s antitrust law . . . .”200  But in addition to Free being 
wrongly decided for the reasons already explained, federal 
decisions, particularly those concerning standing, are considered 
merely persuasive and not binding on Louisiana state courts: 
Federal cases are generally more restrictive in finding 
standing than are state court opinions because of the 
provisions of Article III of the United States Constitution, 
which limits the federal judicial power to “cases and 
controversies.”  No comparable limitation is found in the 
Louisiana Constitution. Article VII, Section 3 of the 
Louisiana Constitution provides, in part: “No function 
shall ever be attached to any court of record, or to the 
judges thereof, except such as are judicial . . . .”  This has 
 
of our state statutes.”); Reppond v. Denham Springs, 572 So. 2d 224, 228 n.2 (La. 
Ct. App. 1990) (“Although the federal jurisprudence interpreting the Sherman 
Antitrust Act is not controlling, it may be used as persuasive interpretation of our 
own state anti-trust statute.”). 
 198. See Hyde, supra note 37, at 687 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court in 
ARC America stated that Illinois Brick was concerned solely with the construction of 
federal antitrust laws, and not at all with state court constructions of state antitrust 
laws.”). 
 199. 982 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D. La. 1997). 
 200. Id. at 1218. 
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been interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction of the State 
courts to “justiciable controversies.”  Stoddard v. City of New 
Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So. 2d 9 (1964).  Thus, the 
federal decisions should be considered persuasive to the 
extent that they recognize “justiciability”, but are not 
necessarily limitations on the jurisdiction of the state 
courts.201 
In FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. (Mylan I),202 the FTC and 
thirty-two state attorneys general as parens patriae sued certain drug 
companies for, among other things, alleged Sherman and Clayton 
Act violations relating to producing and marketing certain brand-
name drugs.203  The defendant drug companies moved to dismiss, 
arguing that plaintiffs had not stated claims upon which relief 
could be granted, and that the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over certain aspects of the plaintiffs’ complaints.204  
Judge Thomas Hogan granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss 
twenty-one states’ restitution or disgorgement claims for indirect 
purchasers because he believed these claims were unauthorized 
under section 16 of the Clayton Act.205 In particular, he ruled the 
Louisiana Attorney General could not assert indirect purchaser 
claims under the Louisiana Antitrust Act “because federal law does 
not give indirect purchasers standing.”206 
But in Mylan II,207 sixteen state attorneys general, including 
Louisiana’s, requested that Judge Hogan reconsider his ruling 
dismissing their restitution claims.208  In doing so, Judge Hogan 
recognized an “internal inconsistency”209 in his ruling granting 
defendants’ motions to dismiss and acknowledged that myriad 
states actually “permit the state to pursue equitable remedies” on 
behalf of indirect purchasers.210  Reinstating “Louisiana’s claims for 
equitable monetary relief under [the Louisiana Antitrust Act],”211 
 
 201. Louisiana Indep. Auto Dealers Assoc. v. State, 295 So. 2d 796, 799 n.1 (La. 
1974).  See also Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Louisiana, 669 So. 2d 1185, 
1192 (La. 1996) (holding that federal decisions on standing and justiciability 
“should be considered persuasive”). 
 202. 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Mylan I]. 
 203. Id. at 32-33. 
 204. Id. at 33. 
 205. Id. at 44-53. 
 206. Id. at 47. 
 207. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Mylan II]. 
 208. Id. at 3. 
 209. Id. at 5. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 6; see also supra text accompanying note 60, ¶2. 
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Judge Hogan instructed that the Louisiana Attorney General is 
authorized to sue under the Antitrust Act,212 and the Act “does not 
limit the state’s ability to pursue the full range of equitable 
relief.”213  Accordingly, “[t]he Court . . . grant[ed] 
Louisiana’s motion and permit[ted] the state to pursue claims for 
restitution on behalf of both direct and indirect purchasers.”214 
B.  South Carolina 
1.  Why the South Carolina Antitrust Act Permits Indirect 
Purchasers to Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing 
Violations 
The South Carolina Antitrust Act reads: 
Any person who may be injured or damaged by any such 
arrangement, contract, agreement, trust or combination 
described in [the Antitrust Act] may sue for and recover, 
in any court of competent jurisdiction in this State, from 
any person operating such trust or combination, the full 
consideration or sum paid by him [or her] for any goods, 
wares, merchandise or articles the sale of which is 
controlled by such combination or trust.215 
South Carolina’s Antitrust Act further instructs that 
“ ‘[p]erson’ shall include natural persons, corporations, trusts, 
partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations and any 
other legal entity.”216  South Carolina courts have indicated that 
“[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and 
effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible.”217  “If a statute’s 
language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of 
statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or 
 
 212. Mylan II, supra note 207, at 6. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 7. 
 215. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-30 (Law Co-op. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 216. Id. § 39-5-10 (defining “person” in the context of South Carolina’s Unfair 
Trade Practices Act, which, like its Antitrust Act, is found both in Title 39 (the 
Code’s “Trade and Commerce” section) and is intended to protect consumers and 
commerce) (emphasis added); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. South Carolina Tax 
Comm’n, 261 S.E.2d 309, 310 (S.C. 1979) (defining “person” as “natural person” 
in a tax dispute). 
 217. Joint Legis. Comm. for Judicial Screening ex rel. McConnell v. Huff, 464 
S.E.2d 324, 326 (S.C. 1995). 
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impose another meaning.”218  “The legislature is presumed to have 
fully understood the meaning of the words used in a statute and, 
unless this meaning is vague or indefinite, intended to use them in 
their ordinary and common meaning or in their well-defined legal 
sense.”219  Given this directive, “person” can only be said to mean 
indirect purchasers or consumers. 
But should a South Carolina court somehow believe the term 
“person” to be ambiguous, the court would be required to construe 
the Antitrust Act, and its primary function when doing so would be 
“to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.”220  “A 
statutory provision should be given a reasonable construction 
consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute,”221 
and “[a]ny ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a 
just, equitable, and beneficial operation of the law.”222 
Like the Sherman Act, the South Carolina Antitrust Act was 
enacted in 1897—long before Illinois Brick was decided.  As a result, 
the South Carolina Legislature could only have intended to permit 
antitrust standing to all persons—including consumers—when it 
passed the Act, as both direct and indirect purchasers had antitrust 
standing at that time. 
Moreover, the South Carolina Antitrust Act contains no 
harmonization clause.  As a result, federal court decisions “may be 
persuasive,” not mandatory, authority,223 and South Carolina courts 
are not required to follow them when interpreting their Antitrust 
Act.224  Indeed, where no South Carolina court has addressed an 
issue, South Carolina courts “may look to other states to determine 
if the issue has been decided and if the decision is persuasive 
 
 218. City of Columbia v. ACLU of S.C., Inc., 475 S.E.2d 747, 749 (S.C. 1996); 
see also Brown v. State, 540 S.E.2d 846, 850 (S.C. 2001) (“When the terms of a 
statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court must apply them according to their 
literal meaning.”). 
 219. Pee v. AVM, Inc., 543 S.E.2d 232, 235 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 220. Lester v. S.C. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 514 S.E.2d 751, 753 (S.C. 1999). 
 221. Davis v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 484 S.E.2d 471, 472 (S.C. 1997). 
 222. City of Sumter Police Dep’t v. One (1) 1992 Blue Mazda Truck, 498 
S.E.2d 894, 896 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bennett v. Sullivan’s Island Bd. of 
Adjustment, 438 S.E.2d 273, 274 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 223. See State v. Colf, 525 S.E.2d 246, 248 (S.C. 2000) (Where state rules are 
the same as federal rules, “federal cases may be persuasive.”). 
 224. See State v. Thrift, No. 23957, 1994 S.C. LEXIS 25, at *23 (S.C. Jan. 17, 
1994) (noting “the federal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, while 
persuasive, [is] not binding”); Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 524 (S.C. 1992) 
(explaining that federal decisions are “persuasive” authority). 
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authority.”225  In this manner, South Carolina courts are free to 
consider the well-reasoned Comes, Bunker’s, Sherwood and Hyde 
decisions when holding their Antitrust Act applicable to 
consumers. 
2.  Why In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation and FTC v. 
Mylan Laboratories, Inc. Do Not Preclude South Carolina 
Indirect Purchaser Standing 
In In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation,226 Judge Jack Weinstein 
believed, “[e]ven were [South Carolina’s] antitrust laws to be 
construed to apply to wholly interstate shipments, South Carolina 
courts would deny recovery to plaintiff because it would construe its 
statute to permit recovery only by direct purchasers in the same way 
that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act.”227  Not 
only was In re Wiring Device wrongly decided for the reasons 
described, as likewise explained, federal decisions are persuasive, 
not binding, on South Carolina state courts.228  And while in Mylan 
I, Judge Hogan also wrongly dismissed South Carolina’s Unfair 
Trade Practices Act claim, believing “indirect purchasers [could] 
not seek damages or restitution . . . [because n]o provision in the 
statute expressly authorize[d] such relief and . . . absent explicit 
authorization by state statute or case law, such relief [could] not be 
granted,”229 in Mylan II he “reinstate[d] South Carolina’s claim for 
restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers under the South 
Carolina UTPA.”230 
C.  Montana 
1.  Why the Montana Antitrust Act Permits Indirect Purchasers to 
Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing Violations 
According to the Montana Antitrust Act, “[a]ny person, if 
injured thereby, . . . may maintain an action to enjoin a 
continuance of an act in violation of [the Montana Antitrust Act] 
 
 225. Silva v. Silva, 509 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1998). 
 226. 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 227. Id. at 85-86 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)). 
 228. See supra notes 223, 224. 
 229. Mylan I, supra note 202, at 51. 
 230. Mylan II, supra note 207, at 9; see also supra note 60, ¶ 2. 
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and for the recovery of damages.”231  Montana’s Antitrust Act is 
found in its Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), and according to 
the UTPA’s “Definitions” section, “ ‘[p]erson’ includes any person, 
partnership, firm, corporation, joint-stock company, or other 
association engaged in business within this state.”232 
When considering to whom its antitrust act applies, Montana 
courts are required to interpret the Act’s words according to the 
legislature’s intent and the words’ ordinary meaning: 
When interpreting statutes, this Court’s only function is to 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  When we 
interpret a statute we determine legislative intent based 
on the plain and ordinary language used by the 
Legislature whenever possible.  This Court must 
reasonably and logically interpret statutory language in a 
manner giving words their usual and ordinary meaning.233 
Despite this instruction, should a Montana court consider 
“person” ambiguous, the court is simply to interpret a statute 
according to the “plain meaning of the words and phraseology 
employed,” giving words their usual construction.234  The standard 
dictionary definition instructs that “person” means “individuals,”235 
and “person” can only be taken to mean indirect purchasers or 
consumers. 
Montana’s Antitrust Act also dates back to 1937—long before 
Illinois Brick was decided.  Because Montana courts’ “function when 
interpreting statutes ‘is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature,’ ”236 its Antitrust Act could only have been intended to 
confer antitrust standing on all persons, which necessarily includes 
indirect purchasers. 
Finally, Montana’s Antitrust Act contains no harmonization 
clause.  Accordingly, not only are federal decisions merely 
persuasive authority when interpreting the Act,237 but Montana 
courts may also consider “persuasive authorities from [Montana’s] 
 
 231. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-222 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. § 30-14-202(7) (2003). 
 233. Crone v. Crone, 77 P.3d 167, 169 (Mont. 2003) (citations omitted). 
 234. State v. Hayes, 32 P. 415, 416 (Mont. 1893). 
 235. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 877 (1991) (defining 
“person” as “human, individual”). 
 236. State v. Lacasella, 60 P.3d 975, 983 (2002) (Rice, J., dissenting). 
 237. See Bradley v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 67 P.3d 306, 310 (Mont. 2003) 
(“[W]e find several decisions in the federal circuits to be persuasive . . . .”); 
Roosevelt v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 975 P.2d 295, 302 (Mont. 1999) 
(considering federal authority “to the extent that . . . [it was] persuasive . . . .”). 
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sister states,”238 such as Iowa, Arizona, Tennessee and North 
Carolina, where indirect purchaser standing has been approved. 
2.  Why Smith v. Video Lottery Consultants, Inc. Does Not 
Preclude Montana Indirect Purchaser Standing 
In Smith v. Video Lottery Consultants, Inc.,239 the Montana 
Supreme Court confessed “there is minimal Montana law 
interpreting the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and no cases 
interpreting [Montana’s Antitrust Act].”240  The court also 
explained the differences between Montana and the Sherman Act’s 
“restraint of trade” sections: 
Although this section is modeled after § 1 of the Sherman 
Act, it differs in one critical respect.  The Sherman Act 
requires two or more persons to be involved in the 
unlawful trade restraint; in effect, a conspiracy must exist.  
However, the Montana counterpart states that a “person” 
may violate this section.  Thus, the Montana statute on 
restraint of trade facially appears to be broader than the 
Sherman Act, as one person acting alone may violate the 
Montana statute.241 
With regard to the Montana “monopolization” section, 
however, the court explained it was “very similar to § 2 of the 
Sherman Act . . . [and that the court] will give due weight to the 
federal courts’ interpretation of this type of alleged antitrust 
violation.”242 
While a potential price fixing defendant may engage the 
foregoing language to suggest Montana courts must slavishly follow 
Illinois Brick to deny indirect purchasers standing, indirect 
purchaser cases do not involve monopolization claims, and indirect 
purchaser (“unlawful trade restraint”) claims are to be construed 
more “broadly” than if brought under the Sherman Act.  And in 
any event, federal cases do not necessarily control Montana courts 
since they are considered merely “persuasive” authority.243 
 
 
 238. Melton v. Oleson, 530 P.2d 466, 470 (Mont. 1974). 
 239. 858 P.2d 11 (1993). 
 240. Id. at 13. 
 241. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 242. Id. (emphasis added). 
 243. Roosevelt v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 975 P.2d 295, 302 (Mont. 1999) 
(explaining federal authority is merely “persuasive” authority). 
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VI. NON-REPEALER STATES WITH ANTITRUST ACTS THAT CONTAIN 
HARMONIZATION CLAUSES, YET INDIRECT PURCHASERS MAY 
STILL PROPERLY PURSUE PRICE FIXING CLAIMS 
Of the six non-repealer states where indirect purchasers have 
standing to pursue antitrust claims, three states’ antitrust acts 
contain harmonization clauses.  When considering harmonization 
clauses, some courts (as will be discussed later) have improperly 
interpreted them to deny indirect purchaser standing pursuant to 
Illinois Brick,244 while others have not.245   
A.  Utah 
1.  Why the Utah Antitrust Act Permits Indirect Purchasers to 
Pursue Damage Claims for Price Fixing Violations 
Section 76-10-919 of Utah’s Antitrust Act, entitled “Person may 
bring action for injunctive relief and damages,” explains that “[a] 
person who is injured or is threatened with injury in his business or 
property by a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act may bring an 
action for injunctive relief and damages.”246 
Utah’s Criminal Code, where its Antitrust Act is found, defines 
“person” as “an individual.”247  In Utah, “[t]he primary rule of 
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in light of the purposes the statute was meant to 
achieve,”248 and the “best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the 
plain meaning of the statute.”249  Where, like here, “the relevant 
statutory language is unambiguous,”250 it “‘may not be interpreted 
to contradict its plain meaning,’”251 and “person” must necessarily 
include consumers or indirect purchasers. 
However, if a Utah court was compelled to interpret the Act 
because it considered the term “person” ambiguous, the court’s 
primary goal must be “to evince the ‘true intent and purpose of the 
 
 244. See infra n.282. 
 245. See Comes, supra note 37, at 446; Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 102. 
 246.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-919 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 247. Id. § 76-1-601. 
 248. De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 746 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting Sullivan v. Sconlar Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993)). 
 249. Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 922 
P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996). 
 250. State v. Hodges, 63 P.3d 66, 70 (Utah 2002). 
 251. Id. (quoting Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)). 
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Legislature.’”252  Because the Legislature enacted Utah’s Antitrust 
Act in 1953—more than twenty years before Illinois Brick was 
decided—the Legislature could only have intended that its Act 
grant standing to all persons, including indirect purchasers, 
because no contrary legislative or judicial scheme existed at that 
time. 
Because “no Utah case has evaluated the elements of a civil 
antitrust violation under the Utah Antitrust Act,”253 Utah courts 
invoking the Act’s harmonization statute are to be “guided by 
interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal 
antitrust statutes and by other state courts to comparable state 
antitrust statutes.”254  The Act’s harmonization clause does not 
require that Utah courts interpret their Antitrust Act to deny 
indirect purchasers standing pursuant to Illinois Brick.  Instead, it 
explains that state court decisions (such as Comes, Bunker’s, Sherwood 
and Hyde) concerning comparable state antitrust statutes can also be 
considered when construing the Act.255  To the extent the Sherman 
Act interpretations are considered, Utah’s harmonization clause 
can be described not as defining who can sue under its Antitrust 
Act, but instead as advancing Utah and federal laws’ uniform 
application prohibiting anticompetitive conduct, as explained by the 
Comes and Bunker’s courts.256  And not to be overlooked, federal 
law—ARC America—instructed that indirect purchasers can pursue 
price fixing claims under state antitrust statutes. 
2.  Why FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. Does Not Preclude 
Utah Indirect Purchaser Standing 
In Mylan I, Judge Hogan dismissed Utah’s indirect purchaser 
claims, explaining “[n]o statutory or common law authority 
specifically addresses the issue of damages for such purchasers or 
for equitable monetary relief . . . . [and] absent express 
 
 252. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 63 P.3d 705, 710 (2002) (quoting State v. 
Tooele County, 44 P.3d 680 (2002)). 
 253. Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. v. State, 29 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 
2001). 
 254. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-926 (1953); see also id. at 661 (explaining Utah 
courts invoke harmonization clause when interpreting Utah’s Antitrust Act). 
 255. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-926. 
 256. Comes, supra note 37, at 446; Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 106.  For a more 
comprehensive discussion concerning indirect purchaser standing despite 
harmonization clauses, see infra Part VII. 
38
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/6
KARON-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  8:56 PM 
2004] TEAR DOWN THAT ILLINOIS BRICK WALL 1389 
authorization, such relief will not be granted.”257  But in Mylan II, 
although Judge Hogan still denied Utah’s damages claim on behalf 
of indirect purchasers, he reinstated “Utah’s claims for restitution 
under the Utah Antitrust Statute . . . .”258  While this ruling may 
appear internally inconsistent, it nevertheless endorses Utah 
indirect purchaser claims’ vitality, albeit for restitution only. 
B.  Virginia 
The Virginia Antitrust Act, entitled “Personal suit for injunction 
or actual damages,” provides: 
(a) Any person threatened with injury or damage to his [or 
her] business or property by reason of a violation of this 
chapter may institute an action or proceeding for 
injunctive relief when and under the same conditions and 
principles as injunctive relief is granted in other cases. 
(b) Any person injured in his [or her] business or property 
by reason of a violation of this chapter may recover the 
actual damages sustained, and, as determined by the 
court, the costs of suit and reasonable attorney’s fees.  If 
the trier of facts finds that the violation is willful or 
flagrant, it may increase damages to an amount not in 
excess of three times the actual damages sustained.259 
When interpreting a statute, Virginia courts are to consider the 
statute’s plain words: 
[I]n interpreting those subsections, we look no further 
than the words utilized by the General Assembly.  “We 
must . . . assume that the legislature chose, with care, the 
words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we 
are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.”  
“The manifest intention of the legislature, clearly 
disclosed by its language, must be applied.”260 
According to Virginia’s Antitrust Act, “[t]he term ‘person’ 
includes, unless the context otherwise requires, any natural 
person . . . .”261  Furthermore, “unless otherwise defined by statute 
[which has not occurred], the term ‘natural person’ means just 
 
 257. Mylan I, supra note 202, at 52. 
 258. Mylan II, supra note 207, at 9; see also supra note 60, ¶ 2. 
 259. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.12 (Michie 1974). 
 260. Homeside Lending, Inc. v. Unit Owners Ass’n of Antietam Square 
Condo., 540 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Va. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 261. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.3 (Michie 1974). 
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that—a natural person.”262  And “[w]hen the legislature has spoken 
plainly it is not the function of courts to change or amend its 
enactments under the guise of construing them [since t]he 
province of construction lies wholly within the domain of 
ambiguity, and that which is plain needs no interpretation.”263 
Because the Act’s plain wording does not exclude any class of 
persons, but rather describes persons as just that—natural 
persons—the Act, by its terms, can be invoked by indirect 
purchasers.  But to the extent a Virginia court may believe “person” 
“is ambiguous, [it] must construe the Statute to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the legislature.”264  The Virginia Antitrust 
Act was enacted in 1974—three years before Illinois Brick.  Because 
“[t]he object of judicial interpretation of a statute is to ascertain 
the intention of the legislature,”265 the Act could have, again, only 
been intended to apply to indirect purchasers. 
But while Virginia courts “have authority . . . to act with respect 
to violations of the Virginia Antitrust Act[, u]nder [its 
harmonization statute], the Virginia Antitrust Act must be applied 
and construed harmoniously with the Sherman Act.”266  In 
particular, Virginia’s Antitrust Act “shall be applied and construed 
to effectuate its general purposes in harmony with judicial 
interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions.”267  
Again, this harmonization clause does not require Virginia courts to 
blindly follow Illinois Brick and deny indirect purchasers standing 
because this clause can be described not as defining who can sue 
under its Antitrust Act, but instead as intended to achieve uniform 
application prohibiting anticompetitive conduct under Virginia 
and federal laws.268  Additionally, of course, under ARC America, 
federal law permits indirect purchaser lawsuits to be brought under 
 
 262. Armstrong v. NEWVA Enter., 23 Va. Cir. 352, 354 (1991) (also noting 
“Black’s Law Dictionary . . . states: Person.  In general usage, a human being (i.e., 
natural person), though by statute term may include a firm, labor organizations, 
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in 
bankruptcy, or receivers.”). 
 263. Winston v. Richmond, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (Va. 1954). 
 264. Armstrong v. Erasmo, 263 S.E.2d 655, 659 (Va. 1980). 
 265. Sellers v. Bles, 92 S.E.2d 486, 494 (Va. 1952) (citing Miller v. State 
Entomologist, 135 S.E. 813, 817 (Va. 1926)). 
 266. Kuhn v. West Alexandria Prop., Inc., 22 Va. Cir. 439, 457 (1980).   
 267. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.17 (Michie 1974). 
 268. Comes, supra note 37, at 446; Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 106; see also infra 
Part VII. 
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state law.269 
C.  Delaware270 
According to the Delaware Antitrust Act, only “[t]he Attorney 
General may bring suit as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons 
residing in this State to secure monetary relief for such persons 
who are injured in their businesses or property by a violation of this 
chapter.”271  Although the Act does not define “natural persons,” 
“[p]rinciples of statutory construction require that undefined 
words in a statute be given their common, ordinary meaning.”272  In 
addition to the standard dictionary definition of “person,” 
Delaware case law discussing other statutes routinely interprets 
“natural persons” to mean individuals.273 
Should a Delaware court consider “natural person” 
ambiguous, however, it is instructed to “resolve the ambiguity by 
reconciling the statutory language with the legislative intent.”274  
“The language of [the Delaware Antitrust Act] is virtually identical 
to the opening provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act,”275 and the 
Act’s harmonization clause276 suggests “it was the Delaware 
 
 269. 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
 270. Because the Delaware Antitrust Act was enacted in 1979, this section 
contains no discussion concerning it predating Illinois Brick.  See 62 Del. Laws, ch. 
89, §1 (1979). 
 271. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2108 (2003); see also Maddock v. Greenville Ret. 
Cmty., L.P., No. 12564, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, *22 (“[T]he Delaware [antitrust] 
statute does not permit individuals to enforce their rights by bringing private 
actions . . . . Instead of providing for a private right of action, the Delaware statute 
expressly grants the state attorney general the right to bring remedial actions.”). 
 272. Jackson v. Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, 700 A.2d 1203, 1205 
(Del. 1997). 
 273. S&R Assocs., L.P., III v. Shell Oil Co., 725 A.2d 431, 437-48 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1998) (in context of U.C.C. claim, explaining that legislature intended 
“natural persons” to mean “individuals,” not corporations or limited partnerships); 
see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Elkay Mfg. Co., Nos. 98C-11-262 WCC and 
99C-11-144 WCC, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 13, *27-28 (Jan. 17, 2003) (“[T]he 
legislature has specifically defined ‘natural person’ to exclude corporations.”); 
Industrial Accident Bd. Second Injury & Contingency Fund v. Photo Color, Inc., 
Nos. 97A-01-018-WCC and 97A-06-014-WCC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 660, *8 (Nov. 
30, 1999) (“While ‘person’ is not specifically defined in the statute, it has been 
commonly defined as, ‘a human being (i.e., natural person) . . . .’ ”). 
 274. Jackson, 700 A.2d at 1205. 
 275. Hammermill Paper Co. v. Palese, No. 7128, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS 400, *12 
(June 14, 1983). 
 276. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2113 (2003) (“This chapter shall be construed in 
harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust 
statutes.”). 
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Legislature’s intention to adopt not only the language but the 
judicial interpretation and application of the Sherman Act.”277  In 
keeping with Comes’ harmonization clause analysis and ARC 
America’s teachings, as well as the Delaware Antitrust Act’s purpose 
“to promote the public benefits of a competitive economic 
environment based upon free enterprise,”278 the Delaware Antitrust 
Act’s harmonization clause does not require that Delaware courts 
automatically deny standing to indirect purchasers.279 
VII. NON-REPEALER STATES THAT DO NOT, YET SHOULD, PERMIT 
INDIRECT PURCHASERS TO PURSUE PRICE FIXING CASES UNDER 
THEIR ANTITRUST LAWS 
Despite having antitrust statutes containing identical “any 
person”280 language and defining “person” broadly,281 courts in five 
 
 277. Hammermill, 1983 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *12. 
 278. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101 (2003) (emphasis added); see also WEBSTER’S, 
supra note 235, at 952 (defining “public” as “a group of people having common 
interests or characteristics”) (emphasis added). 
 279. See also infra Part VII. 
 280. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-35 (2003) (“The state, or any person, including, but 
not limited to, a consumer, injured in its business or property by any violation of the 
provisions of this chapter shall recover treble damages . . . .”) (emphasis added); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 416.121 (2003) (“Any person . . . who is injured in his [or her] 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by [the 
Antitrust Act] may sue therefor in any circuit court of this state . . . and [s]uch 
person may: (1) Sue for damages sustained by him . . . .”) (emphasis added); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:11 (2003) (“Any person injured in his business or property by 
reason of a violation of this chapter may recover the actual damages 
sustained . . . .”) (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 205 (2003) (“Any person 
who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation of this act, may 
obtain appropriate injunctive or other equitable relief and monetary damages and 
shall recover threefold the damages sustained . . . .”) (emphasis added); TEX. BUS. 
& COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21 (2003) (“Any person . . . whose business or property has 
been injured by reason of any conduct declared unlawful in [the Antitrust Act] 
may sue any person, other than a municipal corporation, in district court in any 
county of this state . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 281. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-25 (2003) (“ ‘Person’ means any individual, 
proprietorship, corporation, limited liability company, firm, partnership, 
incorporated and unincorporated association, or any other legal or commercial 
entity . . . .”); MO. REV. STAT. § 416.021 (2003) (“ ‘Person’ means any individual, 
corporation, firm, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association or any 
other legal or commercial entity . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:1 (2003) 
(“ ‘Person’ shall include, where applicable, natural persons, trusts, government 
entities, corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, proprietorships, 
incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.”);  N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:13 (2003) (“For the purposes of this chapter, ‘person’ shall 
mean an individual, corporation, trust, estate, partnership, association, or any 
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of the eight non-repealer states where indirect purchaser standing 
to pursue price fixing antitrust claims has been denied ruled 
against indirect purchaser standing largely because their states’ 
antitrust statutes contain harmonization clauses.282  Courts in the 
three remaining states have imposed “de facto” harmonization 
requirements283 even though their antitrust statutes employ 
similarly broad “person” language and do not contain 
harmonization clauses.284 
 
other legal entity.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 202 (2003) (“‘Person’ means a natural 
person . . . .”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.03 (2003) (“The term ‘person’ 
means a natural person . . . .”). 
 282. Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048, 1058-59 (Conn. 2002) (invoking 
its Antitrust Act’s harmonization clause, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
overbroadly explained its “legislature intended to ‘[give] Connecticut an 
[antitrust] law similar to the existing federal [antitrust] law in every respect’ ”); 
Duvall v. Silvers, 998 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Missouri’s antitrust 
statutes [must] be construed ‘in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of 
comparable federal antitrust statutes.’ ”) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 416.141 (2003)); 
Minuteman v. Microsoft Corp., 795 A.2d 833, 837 (N.H. 2002) (“By including RSA 
356:14 [the harmonization clause] in the statute, the legislature expressly 
encouraged a uniform construction with federal antitrust law.”); Major v. 
Microsoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511, 514 (Okla. Ct. App. 2002) (“Oklahoma legislature 
manifested its clear intent to harmonize the Act with federal antitrust law when it 
enacted § 212 [its harmonization clause].”); Abbott Labs. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 
503, 505 (Texas 1995) (“We begin with the Legislature’s mandate that Texas 
antitrust law be harmonized with federal antitrust law.” (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE § 15.04 (2003)). 
 283. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 718 n.9 (“[T]he holding of Illinois Brick is at 
its core a definition of who can be said to have suffered injury under federal 
antitrust law, and, therefore, by applying Illinois Brick to R.C. 1331.08, it must be 
said that an indirect purchaser is not ‘the person injured.’ ” (emphasis added)); 
Berghausen v. Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“The 
Indiana Act was modeled after section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act . . . and 
has been interpreted consistent with the federal law interpreting the Federal 
Act.”); Arnold v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2999-CA-002144-MR, 2001 WL 1835377, *3 
(Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2001) (“[W]e, like the trial court, find the reasoning of 
Illinois Brick to be highly persuasive . . . and because the [Kentucky] statute is based 
upon the Sherman Act, the interpretation of the Sherman Act given by the United 
States Supreme Court is highly instructive.”).  Importantly, Arnold is an 
unpublished opinion, which “shall never be cited or used as authority in any other 
case in any court of this state.”  Id. at caption.  See also KY. R. CIV. P. 76.28(4)(c) 
(“Opinions that are not to be published shall not be cited or used as authority in 
any other case in any court of this state.”) 
 284. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.08 (2003) (“the person injured in the person’s 
business or property by another person . . . may sue therefor . . . and recover treble 
the damages sustained by the person and the person’s costs of suit”) (emphasis 
added); id. § 1331.01 (2003)  (“ ‘Person’ includes corporations, partnerships, and 
associations existing under or authorized by any state or territory of the United 
States, and solely for the purpose of the definition of division (B) of this section, a 
foreign governmental entity.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2-7 (2003) (“Any person who 
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Adhering to strict harmonization, however, is a dangerous 
proposition.  By denying indirect purchasers standing, these eight 
courts, perhaps unwittingly, adopted an “ongoing parallel federal-
state construction” rule when considering cases under their state 
antitrust acts.  These rulings mean that when interpreting their 
state antitrust acts, these courts must perpetually follow all federal 
antitrust jurisprudence’s twists and turns, including federal courts’ 
frequent and oftentimes disparate “u-turns” or “hairpin turns.”285  
Requiring courts interpreting state antitrust acts to follow ever-
changing federal antitrust jurisprudence raises vexing practical 
problems, undermining the antitrust acts’ stability and integrity. 
For example, where the federal circuits are split (such as was 
the case before Illinois Brick, when most rejected the direct 
purchaser requirement), what federal court must a state court 
following the “ongoing parallel federal-state construction” rule 
treat as the authoritative source on federal antitrust law and, 
accordingly, its antitrust act?  Only the view expressed by the 
United States Supreme Court, which oftentimes comes only after 
years of circuit splits, as occurred in Illinois Brick?  Absent a United 
States Supreme Court decision, must a state court follow the 
majority of the federal circuits?  What case law must a state court 
follow if no clear majority view even exists?  And, as more circuits 
weigh in and the previous majority view becomes the minority view, 
must state courts reinterpret their antitrust acts?  If no federal 
circuits but only federal district courts have considered a particular 
issue, must state courts defer to them as well?  And what if a split 
between federal district courts and federal courts of appeals exists?  
These questions cannot really be answered but rather serve to 
 
shall be injured in his business or property by any person or corporation by reason 
of the doing by any person or persons of anything forbidden or declared to be 
unlawful by this chapter may sue therefor in the circuit or superior court of any 
county . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 24-1-2-10 (2003) (“The words ‘person’ or 
‘persons’ whenever used in this chapter shall be deemed to include corporations, 
associations, limited liability companies, joint stock companies, partnerships, 
limited or otherwise . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.220 (2003) (“Any person who 
purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household 
purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss [by violation of the Antitrust 
Act] may bring an action . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 367.110 (2003) 
(“ ‘Person’ means natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated 
or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entity.”). 
 285. And surely Illinois Brick qualifies as a decisional “u-turn” given the 
contrary federal case law that preceded it and that followed it, namely ARC 
America. 
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demonstrate why fastening state antitrust act interpretations to the 
federal judiciary’s ongoing Sherman Act interpretations is 
unworkable, which is, of course, why none of these state legislatures 
has ever required it. 
Instead, to the extent harmonization is required, 
harmonization aimed not at defining who can sue under a state’s 
antitrust act, but instead at achieving the state and federal laws’ 
uniform application prohibiting noncompetitive practices, such as 
advanced in Comes286 and Bunker’s287 is a much more workable 
solution.  Because state and federal laws regarding similar issues 
can and do coexist and oftentimes complement each other by 
advancing a common purpose, to the extent harmonization is 
required, harmonization of this sort permits state courts to avoid 
unworkable ongoing parallel federal-state construction problems.  
This is because the conduct proscribed by the Sherman Act, like the 
conduct proscribed by these state antitrust acts—namely price 
fixing—has always been consistent.  Moreover, because ARC America 
actually permits indirect purchasers to sue for price fixing violations 
under state law, these state courts would be acting in harmony with 
federal law, not contrary to it, by permitting indirect purchaser 
antitrust standing rather than denying it. 
The notion that courts interpreting state antitrust statutes are 
powerless to depart from the interpretation a federal court has 
given to a federal statute represents a very real and dangerous self-
imposed limitation on these courts’ judicial powers.  These states’ 
constitutions place judicial power inalienably in these states’ 
supreme courts, courts of appeals, and lower courts’ hands.288  
 
 286. See Comes, supra note 37, at 446. 
 287. See Bunker’s, supra note 41, at 106. 
 288. CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The judicial power of the state shall be vested 
in a supreme court, an appellate court, a superior court, and such lower courts as 
the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish.”); IND. CONST. 
art. 7, § 1 (“The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
one Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts, and such other courts as the General 
Assembly may establish.”); KY. CONST. § 109 (“The judicial power of the 
Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be 
divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court of general 
jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court and a trial court of limited jurisdiction 
known as the District Court.”); MO. CONST. art. 5, § 1 (“The judicial power of the 
state shall be vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of districts as 
prescribed by law, and circuit courts.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 72-a (“The judicial 
power of the state shall be vested in the supreme court, a trial court of general 
jurisdiction known as the superior court, and such lower courts as the legislature 
may establish . . . .”); OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 1 (“The judicial power of the state is 
45
Karon: "Your Honor, Tear Down that Illinois Brick Wall!" The National Mo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
KARON-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  8:56 PM 
1396 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
Under these state constitutions and settled federalism principles, 
the power to interpret their state antitrust statutes belongs to state 
courts and can neither be taken away by the federal judiciary nor 
surrendered by any state court.  An ongoing parallel federal-state 
construction doctrine abrogates these bedrock principles, and as 
Ohio Appellate Judge Mark Philip Painter explained in Johnson v. 
Microsoft Corp., “[t]o suggest that Ohio should continue to apply an 
ongoing parallel federal-state construction here undermines Ohio 
courts’ authority and robs consumers of their day in court.”289 
This type of unquestioning adherence to federal Sherman Act 
jurisprudence also contrasts markedly with the deference and 
regard these state courts typically pay when considering other 
federal statutory interpretations.  For instance, these state courts 
regularly consider federal procedural decisions when interpreting 
their own civil rules, yet many refuse to adopt every federal rule 
interpretation in every instance.  For example, in Gulf Oil Co. v. 
Bernard,290 the United States Supreme Court overturned an order 
banning a class action defendant’s unilateral communications with 
putative class members under Federal Rule 23(d).291  Of course, the 
normal federal court practice is to permit these communications.292  
Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court and Texas Court of Appeals 
have held that defendants’ unilateral communications with putative 
class members are barred in Ohio and Texas state court class 
actions.293  In General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,294 the United States 
 
vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions 
thereof, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may from time to 
time be established by law.”); OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“The judicial power of 
this State shall be vested in the Senate . . . a Supreme Court . . . and such 
intermediate appellate courts as may be provided by statute . . . .”); TEX. CONST. 
art. V § 1 (“The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
in one Court of Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals, in District Courts, in 
County Courts, in Commissioners Courts, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in 
such other courts as may be provided by law.”). 
 289. Johnson, supra note 73, at 722 (Painter, J., dissenting). 
 290. 452 U.S. 89 (1981). 
 291. Id. at 104. 
 292. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 
30.24 (1995). 
 293. Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 694 N.E.2d 442, 451-52 (Ohio 1998) 
(“Unsupervised, unilateral communications with the plaintiff class sabotage the 
goal of informed consent by urging exclusion on the basis of a one-sided 
presentation of the facts, without opportunity for rebuttal.  The damage from 
misstatements could well be irreparable.”) (citation omitted); Monsanto Co. v. 
Davis, 25 S.W.3d 773, 788 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (“The anti-suit injunction serves 
the same purpose by preventing Defendants from communicating with the absent 
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Supreme Court allowed federal judges to “probe behind the 
pleadings”295 when deciding class certification, yet the Connecticut 
Court of Appeals requires a trial court to look solely to the 
allegations raised in a plaintiff’s complaint.296  And while the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit mere notice pleading,297 
Missouri’s Civil Rules require fact pleading.298  As demonstrated, 
looking to, considering or being persuaded by federal statutory 
interpretations does not mechanically equate to slavishly adopting 
all federal statutory interpretations. 
These courts’ holdings also belie these states’ long-standing 
pronouncements that their courts must apply their legislatures’ 
intent at the time a statute was adopted until such time as it is 
amended.299  The federal courts’ direct purchaser requirement was 
 
class members via another legal proceeding. Thus, we conclude that the court 
could have found the no-communication injunction and the anti-suit injunction 
were necessary to prevent the evasion of an important public policy.”). 
 294. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 295. Id. at 160. 
 296. Rivera v. Veterans Mem’l Med. Ctr., 818 A.2d 731, 743 (Conn. 2003) 
(“[I]n determining whether to certify the class, a [trial] court is bound to take the 
substantive allegations of the complaint as true.”) (quoting O’Connor v. N. Amn., 
Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 410 (C.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 297. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), requiring a complaint include only “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 
 298. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 
S.W.2d 371, 379 (Mo. 1993) (“Missouri is not a ‘notice pleading’ state.”). 
 299. See Collins v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 778 A.2d 899, 907 (Conn. 2001) 
(“When we construe a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give 
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . .”) (quoting Conway v. Wilton, 
680 A.2d 242, 248 (1996)); Barber v. Echo Lake Mobile Home Cmty., 759 N.E.2d 
253, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Our primary objective when interpreting the 
meaning of a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature that enacted 
the statute.”); Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Louisville, 559 S.W.2d 478, 480 
(Ky. 1977) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of this or any court is to 
construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of the legislature.”); State ex 
rel. Sikes v. Williams, 121 S.W. 64, 68 (Mo. 1909) (“It is fundamental that, in the 
construction of statutes, the courts should so interpret them as to conform with 
the intent of the law making power that enacted them.”); Ahern v. Laconia 
Country Club, 392 A.2d 587, 588 (N.H. 1978) (“It is well-established law that the 
intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute is the touchstone to its 
meaning.”); Henry v. Central Nat’l Bank, 242 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ohio 1968) (“The 
primary purpose of the judiciary in the interpretation or construction of statutes is 
to give effect to the intention of the Legislature, as gathered from the provisions 
enacted, by the application of well settled rules of interpretation; the ultimate 
function being to ascertain the legislative will.”) (quoting State ex rel. Shaker 
Heights Pub. Library v. Main, 80 N.E.2d 261, 263-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948)); 
Knight v. Int’l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1982) (“The 
cardinal rule to be observed in any case involving statutory interpretation is that a 
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not adopted until Illinois Brick in 1977, yet all these states’ antitrust 
acts (except for Oklahoma’s recently reformed act) were enacted 
before 1977.300  Because Illinois Brick’s direct purchaser requirement 
was not imposed until 1977, federal case law permitted both 
indirect and direct purchasers to recover under the Clayton Act for 
Sherman Act violations at the time almost all of these state antitrust 
acts were enacted.  Because these states’ legislatures likely, if not 
certainly, considered the federal courts’ Sherman Act construction 
when they created their own antitrust acts, their acts’ constructions 
had to resemble that which existed when they were enacted; namely, 
a construction allowing indirect purchaser claims.301 
By ignoring their state legislatures’ intentions and instead 
adopting harmonization clause constructions that are unworkable, 
not practical, and offend their courts’ sovereign rights, these state 
courts have chosen to deny recovery to price fixers’ ultimate and 
intended victims based on an inference drawn from their 
legislatures’ inactions.  Courts must let their legislatures’ actions—
not their inactions—prevail.  The language in these state antitrust 
acts permitting all persons who have been injured by anticompetitive 
conduct to pursue their claims must control, even (if not, 
especially) absent specific repealer legislation. 
Paradoxically, these states’ decisions to impose a direct 
 
court must look to the intent of the legislature and must construe the statute so as 
to give effect to that intent.”). 
 300. Connecticut’s Antitrust Act was enacted in 1971, Indiana’s in 1907, 
Kentucky’s in 1972, Missouri’s in 1974, New Hampshire’s in 1917 (yet its section 
providing a civil remedy to “persons” was enacted in 1973), Ohio’s in 1898 and 
Texas’ in 1961.  Oklahoma repealed its original antitrust act and enacted its 
Antitrust Reform Act in 1998. 
 301. Ohio’s Johnson court also relied on its earlier, unreported Acme Wrecking 
Co., Inc. v. O’Rourke Const. Co., No. C-930856, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 745 (Mar. 1, 
1995), decision to extend the holding of C.K. & J.K., Inc. v. Fairview Shopping Ctr. 
Corp., 407 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1980), concerning the Valentine and Sherman Acts’ 
interrelationship to find a comparable interrelationship between the Valentine 
and Clayton Acts.  See Johnson, supra note 73, at 714-15.  But while the Valentine 
Act was adopted in 1898, eight years after Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 
1890, the Clayton Act was not enacted until 1914—eighteen years after the 
Valentine Act had already become law.  While Ohio’s General Assembly clearly had 
the prior Sherman Act in mind (which enunciated certain newly proscribed 
conduct) when it adopted the Valentine Act, it could not have had the Clayton Act 
in mind (which created civil claims for Sherman Act violations).  Thus, unlike the 
Sherman Act, Ohio’s General Assembly could not have even considered the Clayton 
Act when it passed the Valentine Act.  So while the court maintained it was 
required to read the Valentine Act “in light of” the Sherman Act, the same cannot 
be said with respect to the Clayton Act, but neither the Acme Wrecking nor Johnson 
courts ever considered this important distinction. 
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purchaser requirement concerned public policy and, according to 
the Johnson opinion, should have been made by their legislatures 
rather than their courts.302  But in the many years since these state 
antitrust acts were first adopted, and on the occasions when their 
legislatures deemed it necessary to amend them, their legislatures 
have never altered their antitrust acts’ language giving all injured 
persons the right to bring claims.  Indirect purchasers’ rights 
should not be judicially curtailed by superimposing unstated direct 
purchaser requirements onto these states’ antitrust acts. 
Instead of treating this issue as one their state legislatures 
should decide, these courts essentially treat this issue as having 
been automatically made the instant Illinois Brick was decided 
(while paying no regard to ARC America).  These courts believe that 
not only did the direct purchaser requirement automatically 
become part of their antitrust acts as soon as the Illinois Brick Court 
recognized its applicability to Clayton Act claims, but also that their 
own state courts are powerless to depart from this federal 
interpretation absent specific direction from their state legislatures.  
It is entirely inconsistent, however, to rule that their state 
legislatures’ assent is not necessary to make the direct purchaser 
requirement part of their antitrust acts, yet their legislatures’ 
affirmative action is necessary to “remove” it, despite these 
legislatures having never adopted this requirement in the first 
place. 
Finally, interpreting these state antitrust acts as permitting only 
direct purchaser claims renders them largely meaningless.  Under 
this interpretation, direct purchasers’ damages claims would arise 
not only under the Clayton Act but invariably under these state 
antitrust acts as well.  After all, to constitute a Sherman Act 
violation, the conspiratorial conduct must have been “in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States,”303 which describes 
nearly all modern-day commerce.304  Accordingly, a direct 
purchaser would virtually always pursue a federal claim alleging a 
Sherman Act violation rather than a state antitrust claim, which if 
originally brought in state court would most certainly be removed 
by a defendant to federal court.  As a practical matter, then, these 
 
 302. Johnson, supra note 73, at 717. 
 303. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2003). 
 304. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“[I]t is an 
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business 
is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines . . . .”). 
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courts’ antitrust act interpretations leave essentially only 
“intrastate” conspiracies within their antitrust acts’ scope, such as 
when one local newspaper sues another local newspaper for 
anticompetitive activities.  This restrictive application contrasts 
markedly with these states’ directives that entire statutes are 
intended to be effective and must not be interpreted to render 
them largely meaningless.305 
These eight courts’ decisions neglect their antitrust acts’ 
language, the policies underlying their antitrust laws’ enforcement, 
their citizens’ rights, the practicality of pursuing indirect purchaser 
litigation and Illinois Brick and ARC America’s true teachings.  No 
sensible reasons exist for these states to deny their citizens, all of 
them consumers, from pursuing indirect purchaser antitrust claims 
when these consumers have been victimized by price fixing in the 
same manner as consumers in states where indirect purchaser 
claims can be brought.306 
 
 305. See AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284, 305 
(Conn. 2001) (“It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature did 
not intend to enact meaningless provisions.  Accordingly, care must be taken to 
effectuate all provisions of the statute.”) (citations omitted); Guinn v. Light, 558 
N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ind. 1990) (“In construing a statute, the court must consider the 
whole act and, if possible, effect must be given to every word and clause therein.”); 
Felts v. Edwards, 204 S.W. 145, 146-47 (Ky. 1918) (“The general rule of 
interpretation is, that effect must be given to every word in a statute . . . .”); State ex 
rel. Dean v. Daues, 14 S.W.2d 990, 1002 (Mo. 1929) (“[I]t is an elementary and 
cardinal rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, 
clause, sentence, paragraph, and section of a statute, and a statute should be so 
construed that effect may be given to all of its provisions, so that no part, or 
section, will be inoperative, superfluous, contradictory, or conflicting, and so that 
one section, or part, will not destroy another.”); Town of Wolfeboro (Planning 
Bd.) v. Smith, 556 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1989) (“We assume that all words in a 
statute were meant to be given meaning in the interpretation of a statute.”); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 571 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ohio 
1991) (“[E]very word in a statute is designed to have some effect, and hence the 
rule that, ‘in putting a construction upon any statute, every part shall be regarded, 
and it shall be so expounded, if practicable, as to give some effect to every part of 
it.’”) (citations omitted); Muskogee Elec. Traction Co. v. Doering, 172 P. 793, 795 
(Okla. 1918) (“As a general rule, statutes are presumed to use words in their 
popular sense; but the safest rule of construction is to take the entire provisions of 
the statute, and thereby ascertain, if possible, what the Legislature intended.”); 
Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001) (“We must presume 
that the Legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and that a just and 
reasonable result is intended.”). 
 306. It should also be noted that the Ohio and Oklahoma attorneys general 
believe their states’ antitrust acts provide indirect purchaser remedies as evidenced 
by their having brought and settled parens patriae claims on behalf of state agency 
indirect vitamin purchases.  See generally Alaska ex rel. Atty. Gen. Botelho v. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
In a way, the Vitamins defendants committed the perfect crime, 
one from which they reaped billions of dollars yet were never 
required to compensate their ultimate victims—consumers in every 
state.  The fact that more than half our nation’s consumers sued 
and recovered for their indirect purchaser price fixing claims only 
exacerbates this injustice, especially considering that non-
recovering consumers either misapprehended their claims’ 
existence or had their claims wrongly extinguished by earlier, 
misguided courts. 
Despite traditional thinking, the truth is that thirty-nine (and 
arguably as many as forty-four307) states grant indirect purchasers 
standing, either on their own or through their attorneys general as 
parens patriae, to pursue price fixing claims.  Among Comes, Bunker’s, 
Sherwood and Hyde, all logical arguments to the contrary have been 
presented, considered, and rejected.  If indirect purchaser claims 
in the other non-repealer states seem novel, this is only because 
these states’ consumers have never pursued them.  Indeed, these 
claims were likely considered novel when first advanced in Iowa, 
Arizona, Tennessee, and North Carolina.  But consumers’ failure to 
pursue, or when pursued to succeed on, these claims must not be 
taken to mean these claims do not rightly exist.  Instead, non-
repealer states’ consumers, like consumers in Iowa, Arizona, 
Tennessee and North Carolina, have had antitrust standing and 
 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., No. A. 01 1583, 2001 WL 1230932 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2001).  
Ohio’s attorney general also recently filed and settled another parens patriae case 
on behalf of indirect sorbates (a food additive) purchasers.  (No reported or 
unreported decisions exist from the Ohio attorney general’s Indirect Sorbates 
litigation, but a copy of Ohio’s complaint is on file with the author.) 
 307. Only three of the eight non-repealer states whose courts have ruled 
against indirect purchaser standing—Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Texas— 
involve state supreme court decisions.  When presented with convincing 
arguments, these state supreme courts have been known to overrule their own 
earlier opinions.  Therefore, the number of indirect purchaser states would 
increase to forty-seven if reversals were ultimately made.  See City of Waterbury v. 
Town of Wash., 800 A.2d 1102, 1126 (Conn. 2002) (Court overruled its own prior 
cases, noting “[i]n assessing the force of stare decisis, our case law has emphasized 
that we should be especially cautious about overturning a case that concerns 
statutory construction.  Despite this reluctance, however, we have, on occasion, 
overruled cases that have involved the interpretation of a statute.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290, 298 (N.H. 
1988) (overruling earlier New Hampshire Supreme Court ruling); Lubbock 
County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) 
(overruling earlier Texas Supreme Court ruling). 
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remedies all along. 
Price fixers should not be allowed to retain their crimes’ spoils 
while their victims remain uncompensated.  Because virtually every 
state’s antitrust (or consumer protection) laws provide consumers a 
remedy for these crimes, consumers and attorneys general need to 
begin testing and enforcing consumers’ rights.  Our states’ antitrust 
laws were enacted to address consumers’ indirect purchaser claims.  
These laws, when coupled with considerations of natural justice 
and society’s unwillingness to permit criminals to profit from their 
crimes, implore the need, indeed the necessity, for enforcement.  
In most states, consumers already pursue their indirect purchaser 
rights, and it is now time that justice be pursued, and had, by all. 
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